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RIGHTS OF FIRST REFUSAL AND THE
PACKAGE DEAL
Introduction
A right of first refusal has burdened everything from film direc-
tion' and natural gas pipelines2 to securities3 and real property.
4
Though it is often merely an ancillary provision within more com-
plex agreements,5 it is a valuable interest in its own right.6
In the simplest terms, a right of first refusal is a privilege to pre-
empt a contract's execution by matching the price and terms of a
1. See, e.g., Burzynski v. Travers, 636 F. Supp. 109 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
2. See, e.g., W. Tex. Transmission, L.P. v. Enron Corp., 907 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906 (1991).
3. See, e.g., Pincus v. Pabst Brewing Co., 893 F.2d 1544, 1546 (7th Cir. 1990);
Continental Cablevision of N.E., Inc. v. United Broadcasting Co., 932 F.2d 333, 334
(4th Cir. 1991); Radio Webs, Inc. v. Tele-Media Corp., 292 S.E.2d 712, 713 (Ga. 1982);
Pritchard v. Wick, 178 A.2d 725, 726 (Pa. 1962).
4. A majority of cases addressing contracts containing a right of first refusal con-
cern real property. See, e.g., Abdallah v. Abdallah, 359 F.2d 170, 172 (3rd Cir. 1966);
Manella v. Brown, 537 F. Supp. 1226, 1227 (D. Mass. 1982); Myers v. Lovetinsky, 189
N.W.2d 571, 573 (Iowa 1971); Aden v. Estate of Hathaway, 427 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1967);
First Nat'l Exch. Bank v. Roanoke Oil Co., Inc., 192 S.E. 764, 765-66 (Va. 1937);
Tarallo v. Norstar, 534 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). See also Burzynski,
636 F. Supp. at 112 (noting that rights of first refusal frequently appear in contracts,
"particularly those pertaining to real estate").
5. See, e.g., Radio Webs, Inc., 292 S.E.2d at 713 (purchase agreement for shares of
broadcasting company contained right of first refusal to purchase cable television sta-
tion); Gyurkey v. Babler, 651 P.2d 928, 929-30 (Idaho 1982) (real estate purchase
agreement contained right of first refusal to purchase adjacent lot); Anderson v. Ar-
mour & Co., 473 P.2d 84, 86 (Kan. 1970) (lease agreement contained right of first
refusal to purchase demised premises). On occasion, a right of first refusal has been
the essence of an agreement. See, e.g., Pincus, 893 F.2d at 1546 (right of first refusal
to purchase PMP Fermentation Products, Inc. was consideration for stepping down as
president of PL Biochemical, Inc. and assisting in negotiations for its sale); Continen-
tal Cablevision of N.E., Inc. v. United Broadcasting Co., 873 F.2d 717, 718 (4th Cir.
1989) (right of first refusal to purchase cable company and $135,000 was consideration
for terminating litigation and conceding ownership of disputed franchises).
6. Pincus, 893 F.2d at 1549 ("As this case demonstrates, a binding right of first
refusal can be a powerful instrument."); Boyd & Mahoney v. Chevron, 614 A.2d
1191, 1194 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) ("The right of first refusal is a valuable property
right."); American Broadcast Companies, Inc. v. Wolf, 430 N.Y.S.2d 275, 281 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1980) ("The contractual right of first refusal.., is a valuable right which
has enjoyed the protection of the courts."); 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E.
JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 1441A at 949 (3d ed. 1968 &
Supp. 1994) ("The right of first refusal ... is a valuable prerogative."); 1A ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcrs § 261 at 472 (1963 & Supp. 1993) ("The Right of
First Refusal ... is a valuable right.").
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third party's acceptable offer.7 Such rights have enjoyed a long his-
tory of generally consistent treatment in the common law.8 In one
important context,, however, the law is in disarray.9 This disarray
occurs when an owner sells or attempts to sell property burdened
by a right of first refusal as part of a larger package of properties. 10
Ordinarily, the privilege afforded by a right of first refusal is con-
tingent on the owner's willingness to accept a third party's offer for
the burdened property.1' When the owner is only prepared to sell
the burdened property as part of a larger package of properties,
uncertainty arises. Does the proposed transaction trigger the right
of first refusal, and if so, to what extent? Must the rightholder
purchase all the properties in the package to exercise her privilege,
or just the burdened portion alone? And if the proposed sale of
the burdened property as part of a package deal does not activate
the right of first refusal at all, what becomes of the rightholder's
valuable prerogative?
The predicament presented by package deals has a long history
of its own.'2 Despite persistent litigation, however, courts have
been unable to arrive at a uniform approach to the problem.13
Moreover, the recurrence of litigation concerning preemptive
rights within package deals suggests that practitioners are either
overlooking the possibility of such circumstances or are unaware of
the uncertainty the package deal poses.
The goal of this Note is to draw attention to the scope of the
problem and the uncertainty of the law when property burdened
7. Burzynski, 636 F. Supp. at 112 ("A right of first refusal is generally defined as
the right to meet any other offer .... The holder of such a right is usually deemed to
be entitled to match any acceptable bona fide third party offer received by the tender-
•ing party.") (citations omitted); Bennett Veneer Factors, Inc. v. Brewer, 441 P.2d 128,
134 (Wash. 1968) ("The phrase 'first refusal right' and terms of similar import have a
well understood meaning in the business world which is that the owner of such a
contract right is entitled to the opportunity to buy the subject property on the same
terms contained in a bona fide offer."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1325 (6th ed.
1990). A right of first refusal may affect all sorts of contracts, including purchase,
lease and employment agreements. See generally, CORBIN, supra note 6, at 468
(describing different types of rights of first refusal). See also infra note 15. This Note,
however, is concerned with the most common type, the "first right to purchase."
8. Early cases involving a right of first refusal include Reed v. Campbell, 4A. 433
(N.J. 1886) and DePeyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467 (1852).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
12. New At. Garden v. Atlantic Garden Realty Corp., 194 N.Y.S. 34 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1922), aff'd 143 N.E. 734 (N.Y. 1923) is the first reported case to address this
problem.
13. See infra Part II.
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by a right of first refusal is offered for sale as part of a package of
properties. 14 An additional goal of this Note is to propose a fair
and efficient rule to be applied uniformly when parties fail to pro-
vide an express provision in their right-of-first-refusal agreement to
account for this contingency. To these ends, Part I describes the
nature and operation of a right of first refusal and the problem of
the package deal. Part II explains the disparate and unpredictable
relief granted by the courts in litigation arising from the package
deal, as well as the factors used by the courts in adopting and re-
jecting their divergent solutions. Part III proposes a default rule
that would allow the owner to accept a third-party offer for a pack-
age deal, but also permit the rightholder to preempt the sale of that
portion of the package deal that is burdened by the right of first
refusal. This Note concludes that a default rule that would provide
the rightholder with an opportunity to purchase the burdened
property at a reasonable price before the owner may execute the
sale of the burdened property as part of a package deal is consis-
tent with the purpose of rights of first refusal, promotes efficient
right-of-first-refusal agreements and leads to fairness in the dispo-
sition of the problems posed by package deals.
I. The Nature and Operation of the Right of First Refusal
The right of first refusal comes in many forms and guises. 15 It
has been termed a "right of preemption,"' 6 a "privilege of first re-
fusal" 7 and a "preferential right to purchase."' It has also been
14. The combination of the inability of courts to provide certainty in the law by
affording consistent relief in the event of a package deal and the failure of practition-
ers to account for its possibility urges reflection on the matter. Nevertheless, com-
•mentary on the uncertainty posed by the package deal has been sparse and
incomplete. See, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 6, at 480-81 (giving cursory treatment to the
package deal); Ronald B. Brown, An Examination of Real Estate Purchase Options,
12 NOVA L. REV. 147, 174-75 (1987) (cursory treatment of the package deal); Weldon
B. Stutzman & David E. Day, Protecting The Preemptor: Real Property Rights of First
Refusal in Light of Gyurkey v. Babler, 19 IDAHO L. REV. 277 (1983) (discussing treat-
ment of package deal in Idaho).
15. While most rights of first refusal are "first rights to purchase," they also mate-
rialize as "first rights to services," which give employers the right to match a third
party's offer for an employee's services, and "first rights to a job," which give an
employee the right to accept a job an employer is willing to offer a third party. See,
e.g., American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 430 N.Y.S.2d 275 (television network
with first right to employ popular sportscaster Warner Wolf) and Burzynski, 636 F.
Supp. 109 (television director with "first refusal to direct" a film). See generally,
CORBIN, supra note 6, at 468 (describing different types of rights of first refusal).
16. Barling v. Horn, 296 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Mo. 1956).
17. Wellmore Builders v. Wannier, 140 A.2d 422, 426 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1958).
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termed a "first-refusal-to-purchase option," 19 an "option of first re-
fusal"20 and a "first option to buy."21 The first set of terms suggest
that the right of first refusal is merely a privilege or prerogative.
The second set suggests that it is more; it implies that the right of
first refusal is a variety of option contract. 22
In some respects, the right of first refusal differs markedly from
the option.23 The option contains an operative offer at a specified
sum.24 It provides its holder with the power to compel the owner
to sell the option-encumbered property without regard for the
owner's willingness to relinquish ownership. 25 The holder of a
right of first refusal, on the other hand, cannot compel an unwilling
owner to sell.26 In fact, the rightholder's ability to exercise her
privilege is contingent upon the owner's intention to accept a third
party's offer to buy the burdened property. 27 The right of first re-
18. Myers, 189 N.W.2d at 576.
19. Smith v. Traxler, 90 S.E.2d 482, 483 (S.C. 1955); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Wyo.
Nat'l Bank of Wilkes-Barre, 51 A.2d 719, 721 (Pa. 1947).
20. Guaclides v. Kruse, 170 A.2d 488, 490 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied,
174 A.2d 658 (1961).
21. Wallach v. Toll, 113 A.2d 258, 259 (Pa. 1955); Tarallo, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
22. Some courts have expressly stated that a right of first refusal is a breed of
option. Continental Cablevision of N.E., 873 F.2d at 722 (4th Cir. 1989) ("Initially, it
is clear that a right of first refusal is a type of option.") (Mass. law); Ferrero Constr.
Co. v. Dennis Rourke Corp., 536 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Md. 1988) ("A right of first refusal
is a type of option."); Park-Lake Car Wash, Inc. v. Springer, 352 N.W.2d 409, 411
(Minn. 1984) (stating that a right of first refusal is an option contract, except that it
requires the fulfillment of a condition precedent); Myers, 189 N.W.2d at 576 ("A...
preferential right to purchase is a species of option . . ").
23. Duke v. Whatley, 580 So.2d 1267, 1272 (Miss. 1991); Morrison v. Piper, 566
N.E.2d 643, 645 (N.Y. 1990); Landa v. Century 21 Simmons & Co., 377 S.E.2d 416,
419 (Va. 1989); Ollie v. Rainbolt, 669 P.2d 275, 279 (Okla. 1983); Hartnett v. Jones,
629 P.2d 1357, 1362 n.1 (Wyo. 1981); Wellmore Builders, 140 A.2d at 426; 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.64, at 507 (1952).
24. See John D. Stump & Assoc., Inc. v. Cunningham Memorial Park, Inc., 419
S.E.2d 699, 704 (W.Va. 1992); Duke, 580 So.2d at 1272; Morrison, 566 N.E.2d at 645;
Landa, 377 S.E.2d at 420; Ollie, 669 P.2d at 279; Hartnett, 629 P.2d at 1362 n.1; 1A
CORBIN, supra note 6, § 261A.
25. Pincus, 893 F.2d at 1549; Duke, 580 So.2d at 1272; Metro. Transp. Auth. v.
Bruken Realty Corp., 492 N.E.2d 379, 382 (N.Y. 1986); Ollie, 669 P.2d at 279; Shiver
v. Benton, 304 S.E.2d 903, 905 (Ga. 1983); Wellmore Builders, 140 A.2d at 426; 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.64, at 507 (1952).
26. W. Tex. Transmission, L.P., 907 F.2d at 1562; Pincus, 893 F.2d at 1549; John D.
Stump & Assoc., Inc., 419 S.E.2d at 704; Duke, 580 So.2d at 1272; Metro. Transp.
Auth., 492 N.E.2d at 382; Landa, 377 S.E.2d at 419; Ollie, 669 P.2d at 279; Wellmore
Builders, 140 A.2d at 426; 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.64, at 507 (1952);
Brown, supra note 14, at 173.
27. Pincus, 893 F.2d at 1549; Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 177
(Iowa 1993); John D. Stump & Assoc., Inc., 419 S.E.2d at 704; Duke, 580 So.2d at
1272; Metro. Transp. Auth., 492 N.E.2d at 382; Hartnett, 629 P.2d at 1362 n.1; 11 WIL-
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fusal merely provides that the rightholder will be given opportunity
to purchase the burdened property if and when the owner is pre-
pared to sell it to another.28 Moreover, if the rightholder chooses
to exercise her privilege, she will ordinarily be required to match
the price and terms specified in the third-party offer.29 As a result,
LISTON, supra note 6; Brown, supra note 14, at 172-73; Stutzman & Day, supra note
14, at 278.
The precise condition that will activate the right of first refusal depends on the
wording of the agreement creating that right. Pincus, 893 F.2d at 1550; 6 CORBIN,
supra note 6, 1993 Supp., Part 3, at 134-35. But cf infra note 115 (explaining that a
right of first refusal conditioned on the burdened property's impending sale is perhaps
treated the same as a right of first refusal conditioned on the owner's "willingness" or
"intention" to sell the burdened property).
28. W. Tex. Transmission, L.P., 907 F.2d at 1562; John D. Stump & Assoc., Inc.,
419 S.E.2d at 704; Landa, 377 S.E.2d at 419; Metro. Transp. Auth., 492 N.E.2d at 382;
Ollie, 669 P.2d at 279; Shiver, 304 S.E.2d at 905; Wellmore Builders, 140 A.2d at 426; 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.64, at 507 (1952).
29. John D. Stump & Assoc., Inc., 419 S.E.2d at 704; Metro. Transp. Auth., 492
N.E.2d at 382; Ollie, 669 P.2d at 279; Hartnett, 629 P.2d at 1362 n.1; 1A CORBiN, supra
note 6, at 470.
Some right-of-first-refusal agreements specify a price at which the owner must offer
the property to the rightholder when she decides to sell. See, e.g., Old Mission Penin-
sula School Dist. v. French, 107 N.W.2d 758, 758-59 (Mich. 1961); Kershner v.
Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1955); see generally Ferrero Constr. Co., 536 A.2d at
1143-44 (describing three types of rights of first refusal, distinguished from each other
by the method employed to determine the price rightholder will pay to exercise her
right). However, most right-of-first-refusal agreements establish the price and other
terms upon the acceptable third party offer. W. Tex. Transmission, L.P., 907 F.2d at
1562 ("Although some [right-of-first-refusal] contracts specify the price at which the
owner must sell the property, most contracts base the sale price and other terms of
the rightholder's purchase contract on the bona fide offer made by a third party.");
e.g., Pincus, 893 F.2d at 1546; Smith v. Hevro Realty Corp., 507 A.2d 980, 981 (Conn.
1986); Park-Lake Car Wash, Inc., 352 N.W.2d at 410; Myers, 189 N.W.2d at 573.
Moreover, many courts hold that where no price, or mechanism for determining the
price, is stated in the right-of-first-refusal agreement, the third-party offer will set the
price and terms by which the rightholder must accept to exercise her right. Radio
Webs, Inc., 292 S.E.2d at 713 fn.2 ("Where no price is stated when the right is granted,
the offer of the third party supplies the terms under which the right of first refusal
may be exercised."); Brownies Creek Collieries, Inc. v. Asher Coal Mining Co., 417
S.W.2d 249, 252 (Ky. 1967) ("A contract provision giving simply the 'right of first
refusal' ... without qualifying terms means ... that the holder has the right to elect to
take the property at the same price and on the same terms and conditions as those of
an offer by a third person that the owner is willing to accept."); 1A CORBIN, supra
note 6, at 477-48 ("In most cases it can be shown by evidence of accompanying facts
that the intention and understanding of both [the owner] and [the rightholder] was
that before selling to any third party [the owner] would make an offer to [the
rightholder] on the very same terms as those of any actually proposed sale."); 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.65 at 507 (1952) ("If no price is specified in the
[right of first refusal] provision, the natural interpretation is that the offeror's price
must be paid upon exercise of the pre-emption."); see also Weintz v. Bumgarner, 434
P.2d 712, 716 (Mont. 1967); Brenner v. Duncan, 27 N.W.2d 320, 322 (Mich. 1947)
(holding that third-party offer establishes price rightholder will pay to exercise privi-
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the rightholder bears the risk that the owner may only be prepared
to sell the burdened property for unique consideration or under
unconventional conditions.3 0 For example, the owner only may be
willing to accept a property exchange rather than a cash payment.3'
Or, she may be prepared to sell solely for an interest in a commer-
cial partnership. 32 So long as the conditions of the sale are com-
mercially reasonable, imposed in good faith and not specifically
designed to defeat the right of first refusal, the rightholder will be
obliged to match the offer if she wishes to exercise her first refusal
privilege.33 The right of first refusal's essential characteristics and
the mechanics of its application-its nature and operation-then,
are unlike those of the option. Nevertheless, both the option and
the right of first refusal are created for the benefit of the holder.3 4
The right of first refusal is employed for two reasons: one, to dis-
courage the sale of the burdened property to a purchaser who may
use it in a fashion that is undesirable to the rightholder, 5 and two,
to afford the rightholder the opportunity to purchase the burdened
property should the owner ever decide to sell it.36 Moreover, many
lege where right-of-first-refusal agreement expressly leaves price to future agree-
ment). Contra Duke, 580 So.2d at. 1274-75 (affirming trial court's refusal to grant
specific performance on right of first refusal that failed to state, or provide method for
determining, rightholder's purchase price); Hood v. Hawkins, 478 A.2d 181, 186-87
(R.I. 1984); Roles v. Mason, 119 S.E.2d 238, 242 (Va. 1961).
30. See Brown, supra note 14, at 176 and n.144 ("Considering all the variable
terms, besides the price, involved in a contract, the right holder is taking a great risk
of being faced with the choice of an onerous contract or losing the land.").
31. Matson v. Emory, 676 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Wash. App. 1983).
32. Prince v. Elm Investment Co., Inc., 649 P.2d 820, 825 (Utah 1982).
33. W. Tex. Transmission, L.P., 907 F.2d at 1563 ("[T]he owner of property subject
to a right of first refusal remains master of the conditions under which he will relin-
quish his interest, as long as those conditions are commercially reasonable, imposed in
good faith, and not specifically designed to defeat the preemptive rights."); Weber
Meadow-View Corp. v. Wilde, 575 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 1978) ("[T]he decision as to
both the time and the terms upon which the [owner] would sell her property remains
her exclusive prerogative so long as she acts in good faith and without any ulterior
purpose to defeat the right of the [rightholder].").
34. Landa, 377 S.E.2d at 419 ("We noted.., that a right of first refusal is inserted
in a contract for the benefit of the person who is given the right and that it must,
therefore, be interpreted with that purpose in mind."). See also Ollie, 669 P.2d at 279
("A right of first refusal has been described as closely related in purpose to options.");
1A CoRBIN, supra note 6, at 468 ("[Rights of first refusal and options] are closely
related with respect to the purpose for which they are made.").
35. See LIN Broadcasting Corp. v. Metromedia, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 629, 633-34 (N.Y.
1989) (implying that the primary purpose of right of first refusal is to inhibit the sale
of the burdened property); Brown, supra note 14, at 172.
36. Brown, supra note 14, at 172 ("[Rights of first refusal] occur where the owner
was unwilling to sell certain property or rights at the moment, but for a price, or as an
enticement, is willing to give this person the first chance if he should ever change his
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courts agree that when the owner notifies the rightholder of an ac-
ceptable third party offer, the right of first refusal "ripens" into an
option contract.37
To illustrate the operation of an ordinary right of first refusal,38
suppose the owner of contiguous tracts #1, #2, #3 and #4, sells tract
#4 and gives the buyer a right of first refusal to purchase tract #3.
So long as the owner is unwilling to sell tract #3, the rightholder
cannot compel the owner to sell it to her. Once the owner is pre-
pared to accept a third party's offer for the sale of tract #3, how-
ever, the owner must give the rightholder an opportunity to
preempt the sale by notifying the rightholder of the proposed
mind."); see also LEwis M. SIMES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW ON FUTURE INTER-
ESTS § 1554, at 60-61 (1956) ("The similarity of the pre-emption provision ... to the
ordinary... option... at once suggests itself. [An option's] primary purpose is to
enable a particular person to buy.").
37. Stutzman & Day, supra note 14, at 278 ("[Mlany courts-have held that once an
owner manifests a willingness to accept a good faith offer, the right of first refusal
'ripens' into an option and contract law applicable to options applies."). See, e.g., W.
Tex. Transmission, L.P., 907 F.2d at 1565 ("When the preemptive rightholder receives
notice that the property owner intends to sell his property to a third party, the
rightholder's right of first refusal matures into an option."); John D. Stump & Assoc.,
Inc., 419 S.E.2d at 705 ("[A] right of first refusal becomes an option once the holder
of such right is notified by the property owner of the terms of a third-party offer to
purchase the property."); Chapman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 800 P.2d 1147,
1150 (Wyo. 1990) ("We agree with the view that when the condition precedent of the
owner's intention to sell is met the right of first refusal 'ripens' into an option and
contract law pertaining to options applies."); Morrison, 566 N.E.2d at 645 ("[T]he
right of first refusal effectively ripens into an option upon the happening of a contin-
gency: the decision of the obligated party to accept a third-party's offer for the prop-
erty."); Hevro Realty Corp., 507 A.2d at 983 ("Once [owner] notified [rightholder] of
the receipt of [third party's] offer ... [rightholder's] right of first refusal ripened into
an option."); Coastal Bay Golf Club, Inc. v. Holbein, 231 So.2d 854, 857 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1970) ([A] right of first refusal ripens into an option once an owner manifests a
willingness to accept a good faith offer."); see also 3 AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY § 21.02[1]; 1A CORBIN, supra note 6, at 469 ("If B pays a consideration for a
Right of First Refusal, he is buying a right that under stated circumstances 0 shall
make him an offer that will give him an Option to Purchase."); Brown, supra note 14,
at 172-73. But see LIN Broadcasting Corp., 542 N.E.2d at 633 (expressly rejecting
contention that a right of first refusal "is transformed into a binding option" when the
right of first refusal is triggered").
38. The phrase "ordinary right of first refusal" is used in this Note to underscore
that the problems posed by the package deal affect the most common form of the
privilege. Though the language used to create a right of first refusal varies from
agreement to agreement, the most common form of the privilege share the following
characteristics: (1) They are first rights to purchase; (2) they are contingent upon the
owner's intention to sell the burdened property to a third party; (3) they establish the
price the rightholder will pay to exercise her privilege in accordance with the third
party's offer; and (4) they fail to expressly supply a provision addressing the rights of
the parties in the event the owner intends to sell the burdened property as part of a
package deal. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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transaction. The owner's notification is an operative offer. In or-
der to accept the owner's offer and exercise her privilege, the
rightholder must agree to purchase tract #3 herself, for the precise
price, terms and conditions contained in the third-party offer.39
The questions presented by the package deal arise in two similar
but distinct circumstances. The first is when the owner, from the
illustration above, remains unwilling to accept a third party's offer
for tract #3, but is prepared to accept an offer on tracts #1, #2 and
#3. In this scenario, it may be said that the owner's package deal
consists of a number of properties, one of which is burdened by a
right of first refusal. The second circumstance arises when the
owner sells the rightholder tract #4 and gives her a right of first
refusal on lot #3a, which makes up only a portion of tract #3.
When the owner is later willing to sell the entire tract #3-but not
lot #3a individually-it may be said that the owner's package deal
consists of a larger property, a portion of which is burdened.4 °
Both circumstances are usually unaddressed in agreements creating
a right of first refusal.4 ' When these circumstances arise and lead
39. The rightholder must match the third party's offer precisely. Any material
variation from the price, terms or conditions of the third party's offer will be deemed
a counter-offer, and consequently, a rejection, thereby terminating the right of first
refusal. John D. Stump & Assoc. Inc., 419 S.E.2d at 705; Ollie, 669 P.2d at 281 ("[I1n
order to accept the offer, the [rightholder] must fully meet the terms and conditions of
the offer in [her] acceptance."); Brown, supra note 14, at 175-76 ("Ordinarily, a right
of first refusal will bind the [rightholder] to purchase according to the exact terms of
the offer which he has preempted and, absent agreements to the contrary, that is the
way a right would be construed."). See, e.g., Matson, 676 P.2d at 1033 (rightholder
may not exercise right of first refusal with all-cash offer where owner is prepared to
accept property exchange).
40. The same distinction can be made with regard to securities. Suppose 0 sells
RH controlling stock in company #4 and gives her a right of first refusal to purchase
the controlling stock of a separate company, #3. When 0 becomes willing to sell the
controlling stock of company #1, #2 and #3, the package deal is made up of a number
of securities, a portion of which is burdened by a right of first refusal. See e.g., Ollie,
669 P.2d at 280 (third party offer was for a "package unit" of stock that included
burdened stock "as well as other stock ... not comprised within the option right").
However, suppose 0 is unwilling to sell the controlling stock of company #3 at all, but
is willing to sell the controlling stock of company #2, which happens to be the parent
company of company #3. This transfer will bring about an indirect transfer of the
controlling stock of the child-company, #3. In this circumstance, O's "package" does
not include additional securities; rather, it consists of securities that indirectly transfer
the burdened securities. This circumstance is analogous to the sale of a parcel of land,
of which only a portion is burdened by a right of first refusal. See, e.g., Continental
Cablevision of N.E., Inc., 873 F.2d 717 (third party offer only for grandparent com-
pany of company burdened by right of first refusal).
41. In determining the rights of the parties, courts make no distinction between a
package deal consisting of a number of properties, one of which is burdened and a
package deal consisting of a larger property, a portion of which is burdened. Conse-
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to litigation, courts are left with the job of determining what, if
anything, is to become of the rightholder's valuable interest.
II. The Disparate Treatment of the Package Deal
In arriving at a solution to the questions posed by the package
deal, courts have looked to the four-corners of the instrument cre-
ating the right. 2 Frequently, however, provisions creating rights of
first refusal are short on language.43 They neither state the intent
of the parties expressly nor implicitly. As a result, courts have
often relied on generally accepted principles regarding the nature
and operation of rights of first refusal in determining the effect of
the owner's package deal upon the rightholder's privilege.44 Un-
fortunately, these approaches have led different courts, sometimes
within the same jurisdiction, to reach divergent results in the event
of a package deal.45
Courts have chosen from among five different forms of relief in
resolving the problem posed by a proposed sale of a package of
properties, a portion of which is burdened by a right of first refusal.
Two of these forms are based on a determination that an owner's
intention to sell the burdened property as part of a package deal
does not activate the right of first refusal. At least one court adopt-
ing this view takes a harsh line on the matter. This court concludes
that the rightholder's failure to enter into a contract specifically
addressing the possibility of a package deal leaves her without any
quently, this Note uses the terms "package deal", "a larger property, a portion of
which is burdened" and "a number of properties, one of which is burdened" inter-
changeably. The distinction between a larger property, a portion of which is bur-
dened and a number of properties, one of which is burdened is only mentioned to
assist practitioners, concerned with drafting for the possibility of a package deal, in
recognizing how the contingency may manifest itself.
42. See e.g., Crow-Spieker #23 v. Helms Constr. and Dev. Co., 731 P.2d 348, 350
(Nev. 1987); Ollie, 669 P.2d at 279; Anderson, 473 P.2d at 88; Atlantic Refining Co., 51
A.2d at 723; Riley v. Campeau Homes, Inc., 808 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
43. See, e.g., Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1150; Thomas & Son Transfer Line, Inc. v.
Kenyon, 574 P.2d 107, 109 (Colo. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Cohen v. Thomas & Son
Transfer Line, Inc., 586 P.2d 39 (1978); Brenner, 27 N.W.2d at 321.
44. See, e.g., Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1151; Ollie, 669 P.2d at 281; Straley v. Osborne,
278 A.2d 64, 69 (Md. 1971).
45. Compare Aden v. Estate of Hathaway, 427 P.2d 333, 334 (Colo. 1967) (deny-
ing specific performance) with Thomas & Son Transfer Line, Inc. v. Kenyon, Inc., 574
P.2d 107, 111-12 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (distinguishing Aden and awarding specific
performance on the burdened property), aff'd sub nom. Cohen v. Thomas & Son
Transfer Line, Inc. v. Kenyon, Inc., 586 P.2d 39, 41 (1978); compare also Garmo v.
Clanton, 551 P.2d 1332, 1336 (Idaho 1976) (affirming grant of specific performance)
with Gyurkey v. Babler, 651 P.2d 928, 933-34 (Idaho 1982) (denying specific perform-
ance and awarding injunctive relief).
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remedy at all.46 Other courts that conclude the package deal does
not activate the right of first refusal nevertheless hold that the
owner should not be allowed to undermine the rightholder's valua-
ble privilege by entering into such an agreement. 47 These courts
provide the rightholder with injunctive relief. They enjoin the sale
of the burdened property as part of a package deal or, where the
package has already been sold, order the reconveyance of the bur-
dened property to the owner. Courts adopting this solution pre-
clude the owner from ever selling the burdened property to a third
party until she receives a bona fide offer for the burdened property
alone and gives the rightholder an opportunity to match that offer.
Three other forms of relief awarded by courts in the event of a
package deal are based on a determination that an owner's inten-
tion to sell the burdened property as part of a package deal does
activate the right of first refusal. Most of these courts award the
rightholder specific performance on the burdened property alone.48
If the owner is prepared to sell the burdened property as part of a
package of properties, these courts compel the owner to provide
the rightholder with an opportunity to purchase the burdened por-
tion of the package deal. Under this approach, the owner is not
precluded from ever selling the burdened property as part of a
package deal. The owner, however, will only be allowed to do so if
she gives the rightholder an opportunity to purchase the burdened
property first and the rightholder decides not to exercise her privi-
lege. In addition, at least one court adopting the view that the
package deal activates the right of first refusal has held that where
the owner sold the burdened property as part of a package deal,
the rightholder is entitled to contract damages.49 Finally, at least
one court has held that in the event of the package deal the
rightholder is entitled to specific performance on the entire pack-
age. 50 If the owner sells the burdened property as part of a pack-
age of properties, this court compels the owner to provide the
rightholder with an opportunity to exercise her privilege and pre-
empt the sale of the entire package. Under this approach, an
owner who is prepared to sell property burdened by a right of first
refusal as part of a package deal must offer the entire package to
the rightholder at the price and upon the terms that she is willing to
46. See infra Part IIA.
47. See infra Part 1iB.
48. See infra Part TIC.
49. See infra Part lID.
50. See infra Part IE.
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accept from the third party. The rightholder, in turn, will only be
able to preserve her privilege if she is willing and able to match the
third party's offer for the entire package of properties.
Each of these solutions has been adopted by at least one court.5'
Four have been adopted by the highest court of at least four differ-
ent states.52 In addition, at least four courts have criticized and
expressly rejected each of these solutions. 3 Using a representative
case for each of these soiutions, the following sections explain how
courts justify and criticize the disparate remedies awarded in the
event of the package deal.
A. A Case For No Relief
A majority of courts that have addressed the problems posed by
the package deal hold that such transactions do not activate an or-
dinary right of first refusal.54 Nevertheless, most of these courts
51. See, e.g., Chapman v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N.Y., 800 P.2d 1147, 1152
(Wyo. 1990) (enjoining the owner from selling the burdened property as part of a
package deal); Crow-Spieker #23 v. Helms Constr. and Dev. Co., 731 P.2d 348, 350
(Nev. 1987) (permitting the owner to sell the burdened property as part of a package
deal while denying the rightholder any relief); Anderson v. Armour & Co., 473 P.2d
84, 89 (Kan. 1970) (awarding righthoider contract damages where owner sold bur-
dened property as part of a package deal); Brenner v. Duncan, 27 N.W.2d 320, 322
(Mich. 1947) (awarding the rightholder specific performance on the burdened prop-
erty alone where owner~sold burdened property as part of a package deal); Capalongo
v. Giles, 425 N.Y.S.2d 225,.229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (awarding the rightholder specific
performance on the entire package where the owner sold burdened property as part
of a package deal), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Capalongo v. Desch, 438
N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), aff'd, 443 N.E.2d 491 (1982).
52. Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1152 (enjoining the owner from selling the burdened
property as part of a package deal) (Wyo.); Crow-Spieker #23, 731 P.2d at 350 (per-
mitting the owner to sell the burdened property as part of a package deal while deny-
ing the rightholder any relief) (Nev.); Anderson, 473 P.2d at 89 (awarding rightholder
contract damages where owner sold burdened property as part of a package deal)
(Kan.); Brenner, 27 N.W.2d at 322 (awarding the rightholder specific performance on
the burdened property alone where owner sold burdened property as part of a pack-
age deal) (Mich.).
53. See, e.g., Pantry Pride Enter., Inc. v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 806 F.2d
1227, 1229 (4th Cir. 1986) (arguing against specific performance on the entire pack-
age); Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1151-52 (arguing against allowing the owner to enter into
package deals without providing the rightholder with a remedy and contending mone-
tary damages are not necessary where injunctive relief returns the parties to their
former positions without suffering irreparable harm); Myers v. Lovetinsky, 189
N.W.2d 571, 576 (Iowa 1971) (arguing against specific performance on the burdened
property alone); Giles, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (arguing against injunctive relief in the
event of a package deal), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Capalongo v. Desch, 438
N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), aff'd, 443 N.E.2d 491 (1982).
54. See, e.g., Chapman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 800 P.2d 1147, 1151 (Wyo.
1990); Crow-Spieker #23 v. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co., 731 P.2d 348, 350 (Nev. 1987);
Ollie v. Rainbolt, 669 P.2d 275, 281 (Okla. 1983); Gyurkey v. Babler, 651 P.2d 928, 932
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would enjoin the owner from entering into such agreements be-
cause they would, in effect, render the right of first refusal a nul-
lity.55 There is, however, one exception. 56
Judicial authority for permitting the owner to sell the burdened
property as part of a package deal while denying a rightholder any
relief is limited to a decision by the Supreme Court of Nevada in
Crow-Spieker #23 v. Helms Construction and Development Com-
pany.57 In that case, John Robinson, the owner of a considerable
(Idaho 1982); Myers v. Lovetinsky, 189 N.W.2d 571, 576 (Iowa 1971); Straley v. Os-
borne, 278 A.2d 64, 70 (Md. 1971); New At. Garden v. Garden Realty Corp., 194
N.Y.S. 34, 40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922), aff'd, 143 N.E. 734 (1923); Guaclides v. Kruse,
170 A.2d 488, 494 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 174 A.2d 658 (1961).
55. See, e.g., Manella, 537 F. Supp. at 1229; Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1152; Ollie, 669
P.2d at 281; Gyurkey, 651 P.2d at 934; Straley, 278 A.2d at 70; Atlantic Refining Co., 51
A.2d at 725; New Atd. Garden, 194 N.Y.S. at 40; Guaclides, 170 A.2d at 495.
56. Crow-Spieker #23 v. Helms Constr. and Dev. Co., 731 P.2d 348 (Nev. 1987).
57. 731 P.2d 348 (Nev. 1987). Crow-Spieker #23 was the first reported case to
clearly find that the rightholder is not entitled to any relief when the owner sells
burdened property as part of a package deal. An earlier case, Satchels v. Conklin, 150
N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956), aff'd, 141 N.E.2d 916 (1957), which con-
cerned a package deal consisting of an entire lot, a portion of which was burdened,
appears to reach the same conclusion. However, its holding was distinguished in sub-
sequent decisions by the Appellate Division Second Department. In Satchels, the
rightholder sought specific performance on his right of first refusal to purchase the
burdened portion of a larger lot sold to a third party. 150 N.Y.S.2d at 357. The court
upheld the trial court's dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the package
sale did not evince an intention to sell the burdened portion so as to activate the right
of first refusal. Id. at 358. As in Crow-Spieker #23, the rightholder in Satchels was left
without a remedy. Subsequently, in Costello v. Hoffman, 291 N.Y.S.2d 116, 118 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1968), the Second Department explained that it did not provide the
rightholder in Satchels any remedy-though he was entitled to injunctive relief-be-
cause the rightholder only asked for specific performance, a remedy which he was not
entitled to. This explanation is dubious. If the Satchels court believed that the
rightholder was entitled to some other relief it would have been more appropriate to
dismiss the case without prejudice to replead. See, e.g., K.S. & S. Restaurant Corp. v.
Yarbough, 479 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (Second Department case
dismissing complaint without prejudice to replead where rightholder only asked for
specific performance of right of first refusal to purchase burdened property that had
been sold as part of package deal). To bolster its explanation of Satchels, the Costello
court noted that the court in Satchels did not use language indicating that it was
"overruling" New Atd. Garden, 194 N.Y.S. 34, an earlier case which held that the
rightholder is entitled to injunctive relief, preventing the sale of the burdened portion
as part of a larger package, or where the package has already been sold, reconveyance
to the owner of the burdened portion. Costello, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 118. This argument
is unconvincing. New Atl. Garden was a First Department case; the Second Depart-
ment was not bound by its holding. Moreover, two justices in Satchels dissented sepa-
rately, citing New Atd. Garden for the proposition that reconveyance of the burdened
portion is the appropriate remedy. These dissents suggest that the majority in Satch-
els was, in fact, not following the holding in New Atd. Garden. See also Aden, 427 P.2d
at 334 (affirming dismissal of complaint in which only specific performance was
sought).
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amount of realty, sold Crow-Spieker #23, a co-partnership, a tract
of land and granted it a right of first refusal to purchase an adjacent
tract.58 Subsequently, Robinson sought to sell the burdened tract,
consisting of approximately 50 acres, as part of a 198-acre package
to a third party for more than two million dollars. Crow-Spieker
was given the opportunity to match the offer for the entire pack-
age, but instead attempted to exercise its right of first refusal on
the burdened tract alone.59 Robinson responded by selling the en-
tire package to the third party; Crow-Spieker sued.6°
The trial court held that the sale of the package deal breached
Crow-Spieker's right of first refusal and awarded it damages. 61 The
Supreme Court of Nevada reversed, holding there was no breach
of the contractual right of first refusal and that Crow-Spieker was
not entitled to any relief.62 The rationale employed by the court
was that the "terms of the right of first refusal ... applied only to
offers to purchase [the burdened property] alone. 63 A third
party's offer to purchase a package of properties was simply a dif-
ferent transaction from the one contemplated by the right-of-first-
refusal agreement. 61 The Supreme Court of Nevada reasoned that
so long as the owner, in good faith, is only willing to sell the bur-
dened tract as part of a larger parcel, the right of first refusal is
"totally inapplicable. 65 It is not clear whether the Nevada
Supreme Court meant the right of first refusal was inapplicable and
therefore extinguished or inapplicable but still potentially effective
if the package-deal purchaser should ever decide to accept an offer
58. Id. at 349. The right of first refusal was set forth in a letter accompanying the
proposed sale agreement and read:
[Ilf and when we decide to sell the parcel of land south of parcel A ... you
shall have the first opportunity to purchase the same for the price, and sub-
ject to the terms under, which we are willing to sell the same; or if we receive
a bona fide offer for said parcel which is acceptable to us, from another
party, you shall have the first opportunity to purchase the same for the price
offered by the other party and subject to the same terms as contained in such
offer ....
Id. Though there is no uniformity in the drafting of rights of first refusal, the sub-
stance of the quoted provision mirrors typical right of first refusal agreements.
59. Id.
60. Crow-Spieker #23, 731 P.2d at 350.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. The court reached this determination sua sponte. Id. at 350 n.2.
64. See also Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1151 ("The condition precedent triggering exer-
cise or waiver of the [rightholder's] right did not occur because no price was ever set
for that property by third party negotiation and, as a result, there was no offer for the
[rightholder] to match.").
65. Crow-Spieker #23, 731 P.2d at 350.
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for the burdened property alone.66 The distinction, however, is ac-
ademic. If the first owner could by-pass the privilege by selling the
burdened property as part of a package deal, so could each succes-
sive owner. Whether the owner may destroy the right entirely or
simply by-pass doesn't change the fact that. In either case, the
owner has the ability to render the right of first refusal entirely
ineffectual.
In denying relief in these situations, the Nevada court inter-
preted the right-of-first-refusal agreement literally. This literal
compliance with the language, however, permits every right of first
refusal to be rendered a nullity. Every owner could eviscerate the
effect of a right of first refusal by attaching additional property to
the burdened plot and offering the resulting package for sale.67
Under elementary rules of contract interpretation, however, every
agreement contains an implied covenant that neither party will
cause the destruction of the other party's rights. 68 If the right of
66. Compare Brown, supra note 14, at 175 and n.137 (citing Crow-Spieker #23 for
the proposition that "under certain circumstances, the right holder may lose [her]
right") (emphasis added) with 3 AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 21.02[3] and
n.14 (citing Crow-Spieker #23 for the proposition that "a sale of a larger tract of land
which includes the [burdened] parcel may not activate the right, but the right will
continue to be binding upon the purchaser of the larger tract and may be exercised
upon the sale of the [burdened] parcel").
67. Many courts expressly reject the Nevada approach precisely because it would
permit owners to void rights of first refusal by attaching additional land to the bur-
dened property. Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1151 (also noting that Crow-Spieker #23 is
against majority view); Straley, 278 A.2d at 70; Guaclides, 170 A.2d at 495 ("To allow
the owner of the whole to by-pass the optionee merely by attaching additional land to
the part under option would render nugatory a substantial right which the optionee
had bargained for and obtained."); C & B Wholesale Stationary v. S. De Bella
Dresses, Inc., 349 N.Y.S.2d 751, 753 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) ("The [owner's] sale of the
[burdened property] as part of the larger parcel violated the first refusal clause.").
See also Radio Webs, Inc., 292 S.E.2d at 715 ("We find the [cases concluding that sale
of burdened property as part of larger package breaches right of first refusal agree-
ment] applicable to sales of businesses; to find otherwise would facilitate defeat of
contractual rights of first refusal by inclusion of extraneous matters."). Most courts
addressing the package deal have taken it for granted that offering the burdened
property for sale as part of a larger package is a breach of the right of first refusal
agreement. See Gyurkey, 651 P.2d at 932; Myers, 189 N.W.2d at 575.
68. See Antony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 583 N.E.2d 806, 820-22 (Mass.
1991); Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 26 (Okla. 1989); W.V. Pangborne & Co. v.
New Jersey DOT, 562 A.2d 222, 230 (N.J. 1989); Gallagher v. Lambert, 549 N.E.2d
136, 141 (N.Y. 1989); Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 844 (Cal. 1985);
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 383 P.2d 107, 111 (Or. 1963); Sellers v. Head, 73 So.2d
747, 751 (Ala. 1954); 3 CORBIN, supra note 6, § 278 ("In every contract there is an
implied covenant that neither party shall do anything that will have the effect of de-
stroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.").
See also 1A CORBIN, supra note 6, at 474 ("It is a violation of duty for [the owner] to
make a contract to sell [the burdened property] on any terms, even though the con-
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first refusal is rendered inapplicable by a package deal, entering
into such transactions would be contrary to the owner's implied
covenant not to destroy the rightholder's right of first refusal. The
Nevada approach is, therefore, untenable.69
B. A Case For Enjoining Package Sales
Most courts that hold the package deal does not activate the or-
dinary right of first refusal nevertheless enjoin the sale of the bur-
dened property as part of a package deal.70 If the properties have
already been conveyed, these courts order the reconveyance of the
burdened property to the owner.7' In either case, the owner is
barred from selling the burdened property until she receives an of-
fer for the burdened property alone and provides the rightholder
with an opportunity to match that offer.72 Courts taking this ap-
proach recognize that the owner breaches the right-of-first-refusal
agreement by attempting to sell the burdened property as part of a
package deal.73
The most recent reported case prescribing injunctive relief is
Chapman v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York. 74 InChapman, the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York
(MONY) received an offer for the sale of 273 acres of land for
$75,000. Frank and Sharon Chapman possessed a right of first re-
fusal on 22.6 of these acres.75 On the chance that the proposed sale
activated the Chapmans' right of first refusal, MONY notified the
tract is expressly made 'subject to' the right of [the rightholder]. If courts should hold
otherwise, they would thereby extract most of the 'teeth' of [the rightholder's]
right.").
69. See Boyd & Mahoney, 614 A.2d at 1194 ("Common sense... require[s] us to
hold that a right of first refusal as to the conveyance of property cannot be defeated
by including that property in a multi-property or multi-asset transaction.").
70. See, e.g., Manella, 537 F. Supp. at 1229; Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1152; Ollie, 669
P.2d at 281; Gyurkey, 651 P.2d at 934; Straley, 278 A.2d at 70; Atlantic Refining Co., 51
A.2d at 725; New Atl. Garden, 194 N.Y.S. at 40; Guaclides, 170 A.2d at 495.
71. See, e.g., Wallach, 113 A.2d at 261; Tarallo, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 487; C & B Whole-
sale Stationary, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 754; cf. Saab Enters., Inc. v. Wladislaw Wunderbar,
554 N.Y.S.2d 657, 658 (affirming trial court's order for reconveyance of entire pack-
age deal).
72. Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1152; Wallach, 113 A.2d at 261; Atlantic Refining Co., 51
A.2d at 725; New Atd. Garden, 194 N.Y.S. at 41; Guaclides, 170 A.2d at 495; Tarallo,
534 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
73. Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1151; Gyurkey, 651 P.2d at 932; Myers, 189 N.W.2d at
575; Straley, 278 A.2d at 70; Guaclides, 170 A.2d at 495. See also Radio Webs, Inc.,
292 S.E.2d at 715.
74. 800 P.2d 1147 (Wyo. 1990).
75. Id. at 1148-49. The right-of-first-refusal provision read as follows: "As part of
this agreement, and for the consideration received herewith, Seller will give Buyers
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rightholders of the proposed sale and gave them an opportunity to
purchase the burdened tract for $15,731.18. This price was based
on the value the third party ascribed to the burdened tract.76 The
Chapmans, however, asserted that the third party's offer ($75,000/
273 acres) was equivalent to $265.00 per acre and, consequently,
sought to exercise their privilege at $5,992.58 (22.6. x $265.00).
MONY refused their offer and the Chapmans subsequently
brought suit to compel specific performance of their right of first
refusal at $265.00 per acre. The trial court dismissed the complaint.
It held that by refusing to accept MONY's offer the Chapmans
failed to exercise their right of first refusal, and in effect, lost their
privilege." On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming ruled that
the third party's offer for the larger parcel did not activate the
Chapmans' right of first refusal.78 Consequently, the Chapmans
could not have waived their privilege by refusing to accept
MONY's offer.79 The court concluded that the proper remedy
under the circumstances was to enjoin MONY from selling the 22.6
acres except in response to a bona fide offer for the burdened prop-
erty, and only after giving the Chapmans an opportunity to exer-
cise their right of first refusal.80
The Wyoming Supreme Court employed two lines of reasoning
in concluding the package deal does not activate a right of first
refusal. First, a right of first refusal merely gives its holder the right
to match a third party offer for the burdened property.81 So long
as no acceptable offer has been made for the burdened property
alone, the rightholder is incapable of exercising her privilege be-
cause there is no offer for her to match. 82 In addition, the right of
the first option to buyer [sic] and first right of refusal to match any future offers on the
[burdened property]." Id. at 1150.
76. At MONY's request, the third party disclosed her method of arriving at her
$75,000 offer. The third party claimed that her purchase price was arrived at by valu-
ing the package deal's dry land at $105.00 per acre and its irrigated land, including the
burdened property, at $696.07 per acre. Id. at 1149.
77. Id. at 1149.
78. Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1151 (Wyo. 1990).
79. Id. at 1150.
80. Id. at 1152.
81. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
82. Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1151 ("The condition precedent triggering [the] right
did not occur because no price was ever set for that property by third party negotia-
tion and, as a result, there was no offer for [the burdened property] for the Chapmans
to match."). See also Gyurkey, 651 P.2d at 932 ("In [the event of a package deal], it is
simply impossible for a preemptive rightholder to verify the precise price, not to men-
tion other terms and conditions, at which she is entitled to purchase the property in
order to obtain the same bargain on the lot that the third party offeror is to receive.").
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first refusal is not activated by a package deal because the owner's
intention to sell a package of properties is not tantamount to an
intention to sell the burdened property.83 By the terms of the
right-of-first-refusal agreement, the owner is to remain in control
of the price she is to receive for the burdened property.8 A right
of first refusal merely gives a rightholder the privilege of purchas-
ing the burdened property at a price the owner finds acceptable.85
Unless the owner is prepared to accept an offer for the burdened
property alone, the price the owner finds acceptable for that partic-
ular property remains unknown. Any method employed by the
courts to establish the price the rightholder would pay to exercise
her privilege would deprive the owner of her right to remain in
control of the price she is willing to accept.8 6
83. Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1151. See also Ollie, 669 P.2d at 280 ("An attempt to
sell larger tract is not to be taken as a manifestation of an intention on the part of the
owner to sell the smaller (option-encumbered) portion separately."); Straley, 278
A.2d at 69 ("[T]he contemplation (or even the acceptance) by the [owner] of an offer
for the larger tract is no manifestation of an intention on his part to sell the smaller
([burdened]) portion separately."); New Atl. Garden, 194 N.Y.S. at 40 ("[T]he fact
that [the owner] attempted to sell the whole should not be taken ... as a manifesta-
tion ... of an intention or desire to sell the [burdened property] so as to give the
[rightholder] the right to exercise the option to purchase the same."); Guaclides, 170
A.2d at 494 ("[T]he attempted sale of the whole tract for a single price is no indication
of an intention or desire to sell the [burdened] portion alone.").
84. See W. Tex. Transmission, L.P., 907 F.2d at 1563 ("[Tlhe owner of property
subject to a right of first refusal remains master of the conditions under which he will
relinquish his interest."); Weber Meadow-View Corp., 575 P.2d at 1055 ("[Tlhe deci-
sion as to both the time and the terms upon which the [owner] would sell her property
remains her exclusive prerogative.").
85. Gyurkey, 651 P.2d at 932 ("By possessing the right to purchase on the same
terms and conditions, [the rightholder] had in essence the right to obtain precisely the
same 'bargain' on [the burdened property] as the seller was willing to grant to a third
party offeror.").
86. Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1151 ("The general rule that an attempt to sell the
whole may not be taken as a manifestation of an intention or desire on the part of the
owner to sell the smaller [burdened] part .... protects the owner from making a sale
he did not desire."); Ollie, 669 P.2d at 281 ("An owner should not be compelled to sell
property on terms and conditions to which he has not agreed or which he has not
intended to accept."); Gyurkey, 651 P.2d at 933 ("[Tlhe owner . . . should not be
compelled to sell the particular property when he has never received an offer, or
intended to sell the property on the terms and conditions asserted by the preemp-
tor."); see also Gyurkey, 651 P.2d at 933 ("[Clourts should not compel an owner to sell
property on terms and conditions upon which he has not agreed or which he has not
intended to accept."); Straley, 90 S.E.2d at 488 ("However equitable it may seem [to
allow the rightholder to purchase the burdened property at a proportionate value of
the package], it has no legal foundation. The [owner] may or may not have regarded
the lots of equal value and it was for him to decide."); Guaclides, 170 A.2d at 494 ("In
order to apportion [the value of the burdened property to the package deal] a court
would ... have to remake the parties' agreement .... ").
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While the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that the owner's at-
tempt to sell the burdened property as part of a package of proper-
ties does not activate the right of first refusal, it also held that it
would be improper to allow the owner to circumvent the right of
first refusal by entering into such agreements.8 7 Following a major-
ity of courts, 8 the Wyoming court held that the appropriate rem-
edy was to enjoin the owner from selling the burdened, property
until she received an offer for the burdened tract alone and gave
the rightholder an opportunity to match that offer.8 9
The value of injunctive relief is that by returning the parties to
the positions they maintained prior to the attempted sale of the
package deal, the rightholder's valuable privilege is not rendered a
nullity. In addition, the privilege is afforded an opportunity to be
triggered as contemplated by the right-of-first-refusal agreement:
the owner's intention to sell the burdened property at a price
deemed acceptable through negotiations with a third party.90 The
rationale for awarding injunctive relief in the event of a package
deal is persuasive; however, this solution is in some respects con-
trary to the operation of the right of first refusal and against the
expectations of the owner. Under the terms of an ordinary right of
first refusal, the owner expects to remain in control of the price as
well as the manner in which her property is disposed.91 Enjoining
package sales deprives the owner of a legitimate means of market-
ing her burdened property. Moreover, it may affect her ability to
market other property that is unburdened, but whose value, and use
87. Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1151.
88. See, e.g., Manella, 537 F. Supp. at 1229; Ollie, 669 P.2d at 281; Gyurkey, 651
P.2d at 934; Straley, 278 A.2d at 70; Atlantic Refining Co., 51 A.2d at 725; New At!.
Garden, 194 N.Y.S. at 40; Guaclides, 170 A.2d at 495.
89. Id. at 1152. Two courts awarding this relief have expressly held that the third
party offer for the burdened property must be unrelated to any other property. See
Ollie, 669 P.2d at 281 ("The remedy properly afforded in this case calls on the court to
enjoin the [owners] from transferring their ownership in the preemption-encumbered
stock until they have received a bona fide offer that is unrelated to any other stock and
given the [rightholders] appropriate notice with the opportunity to meet that offer
..... ) (emphasis added); Gyurkey, 651 P.2d at 934 ("The proper remedy in this case is
to enjoin the owners from selling [the burdened property] until they receive an ac-
ceptable offer for [the burdened property] unrelated to the sale of any other property
.... ") (emphasis added).
90. Chapman, 800 P,2d at 1152 ("Returning the parties to the positions they occu-
pied before the attempted sale of the [package deal] recognizes their agreement and
provides the opportunity for its performance without judicial intrusion into establish-
ment of the price term of any desired sale.").
91. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
THE PACKAGE DEAL
is contingent, at least to some extent, on the burdened property. 92
This is especially true in those jurisdictions that prevent an owner
from entering into an agreement to sell the burdened property un-
less the agreement is entirely unrelated to an agreement for the
sale of any other property.93 Consequently, allowing the right of
first refusal to proscribe the manner in which the burdened prop-
erty is to be disposed of and permitting it to affect adversely the
marketability of property not covered by the privilege is contrary
to both the owner's expectations and the privilege's operation. In
addition, injunctive relief is contrary to the rightholder's expecta-
tions. One reason rights of first refusal are employed is to provide
the rightholder an opportunity to buy the burdened property when
the owner decides to sell it.94 By limiting the rightholder to injunc-
tive relief, an owner willing to sell the burdened property is permit-
ted to rely on a condition she herself created to deny the
rightholder an opportunity to purchase the burdened property. 95
From the rightholder's perspective, the owner's attempt to sell the
burdened property as part of a package deal is no different from
the owner's attempt to sell the burdened property alone.96 In
either case, ownership of the burdened property is to be trans-
ferred, and the reasons the rightholder entered into the right-of-
first-refusal agreement would be implicated. 97
92. Capalongo v. Giles, 425 N.Y.S.2d 225, 228 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (arguing that if
the owner is prohibited from selling the burdened property except in response to an
offer for the burdened property alone, the owner "might have to hold on to [the
burdened property] forever, and perhaps also to the larger parcel if, as may very well
be the case here, it was not suitable for development without including the [burdened
property]"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Capalongo v. Desch, 438 N.Y.S.2d 638
(N.Y. App. Div. 1981), aff'd, 443 N.E.2d 491 (1982). See generally Stutzman & Day,
supra note 14, at 292-93 (explaining that from among the possible solutions to the
package deal, injunctive relief places the heaviest restraint on alienation).
93. See supra note 89.
94. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
95. Brenner, 27 N.W.2d at 322; Maron v. Howard, 66 Cal. Rptr. 70, 78 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1968).
96. See Continental Cablevision of N.E., Inc., 873 F.2d at 719 (Right of first refusal
implicated by sale of grandparent company because right of first refusal's objectives
"were as much affected by [sale of] stock in [the grandparent company] ... *as by [a
sale of] stock in [the burdened company] itself."); Anderson, 473 P.2d at 89 ("[A]s far
as the [rightholders] were concerned, the [burdened property was] effectively 'sold'
and placed beyond their reach, regardless of the details of the [package deal] transac-
tion between the [owner] and [the third party].").
97. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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C. A Case For Specific Performance On The Burdened
Property Alone
A small but significant number of courts addressing the package
deal have concluded that such transactions activate the right of first
refusal.98 Even among these courts, however, there is a disparity in
the relief awarded. At least one court has awarded contract dam-
ages;99 another has awarded specific performance on the entire
package. 1°° Nevertheless, among the courts that conclude the right
of first refusal is activated by a package deal, most hold that the
rightholder is entitled to specific performance on the burdened
property alone.' 0'
Brenner v. Duncan 1 2 is one of the first cases to award specific
performance solely on the burdened property at the occurrence of
a package deal.'0 3 In Brenner, the rightholders leased the west 75
feet of a 100-foot wide parcel of land.' ° The lease agreement con-
98. See, e.g., Pantry Pride Enters., Inc. v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 630 F.
Supp. 637, 640 (E.D.Va.), aff'd, 806 F.2d 1227 (1986); Berry-Iverson Co. of N.D., Inc.,
v. Johnson, 242 N.W.2d 126, 134 (N.D. 1976); Anderson, 473 P.2d at 89; Denco v.
Belk, 97 So.2d 261, 265 (Fla. 1957); Brenner, 27 N.W.2d at 322; Riley, 808 S.W.2d at
189; Capalongo v. Giles, 425 N.Y.S.2d 225, 228 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Capalongo v. Desch, 438 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), aff'd,
443 N.E.2d 491 (1982).
99. Anderson, 473 P.2d at 89.
100. Giles, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
101. See, e.g., Pantry Pride Enters., Inc., 630 F. Supp. at 640; Berry-Iverson, 242
N.W.2d at 134; Denco, 97 So.2d at 265; Brenner, 27 N.W.2d at 322; Riley, 808 S.W.2d
at 189.
102. 27 N.W.2d 320 (Mich. 1947).
103. Other courts to adopt this solution include Pantry Pride Enter., Inc. v. Stop &
Shop Companies, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 637, 640 (E.D. Va.) (granting rightholder opportu-
nity to purchase burdened portion of package deal), modified on other grounds, 806
F.2d 1227 (4th Cir. 1986) (modification concerned the amount rightholder must pay to
exercise right); Berry-Iverson, 242 N.W.2d at 134 (affirming trial court's grant of spe-
cific performance on burdened portion of package deal); Denco, 97 So.2d at 265
(adopting Brenner-rule);Wilson v. Brown, 55 P.2d 485, 488 (Cal. 1936) (affirming trial
court's judgment, permitting rightholder to purchase burdened portion of package
deal); Riley v. Campeau Homes, 808 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (burdened
property need not be sold alone to activate right of first refusal). See also Thomas &
Son Transfer Line, Inc, v. Kenyon, Inc., 574 P.2d 107, 112 (Colo. 1977) (distinguishing
Aden v. Estate of Hathaway, 427 P.2d 333, 334 (Colo. 1967) (rejecting specific per-
formance on the burdened portion and granting injunctive relief) and awarding
rightholder opportunity to purchase burdened portion of package deal), aff'd sub
nom. Cohen v. Thomas & Son Transfer Line, Inc., 586 P.2d 39 (1978); Garmo v.
Clanton, 551 P.2d 1332, 1336 (Idaho 1976) (affirming grant of specific performance of
right of first refusal on burdened portion of package deal). Garmo was later distin-
guished in Gyurkey v. Babler, 651 P.2d 928, 933 n.1 (Idaho 1982), where the court
refused to grant specific performance on the burdened portion of the package and
merely enjoined the sale of burdened property as part of package deal. Id. at 933-34.
104. Brenner, 27 N.W.2d at 320.
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tained the following provision: "That in the event the land is to be
sold, the tenant will be given first preference and allowed to
purchase said land if the parties can agree on the price."'10 5 The
owner later sold the entire 100-foot property to a third party for
$15,000, and the rightholders filed suit for specific performance.
The trial court held that the right-of-first-refusal agreement was
unenforceable for vagueness because it left the purchase price for
future agreement. Additionally, the court held that the condition
that was to activate the right of first refusal-the owner's willing-
ness to sell the burdened property-never occurred. The court dis-
missed the complaint, asserting that the owner's sale of the entire
100-foot parcel merely evinced a desire to sell the larger parcel; it
did not indicate a willingness to sell the west 75-foot portion
alone.1°6 The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed. 0 7
Addressing the contention that the right of first refusal was in-
definite, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that where the price
for the property subject to the right of first refusal is left for future
agreement, the price becomes fixed by the amount at which the
owner later agrees to sell the property.10 8 In addition, the court
rejected the argument that the right of first refusal was not acti-
vated by the package sale. The court stated simply, "the condition
of the option 'in the event the land is to be sold' did occur. "109
Consequently, the court reasoned that the right of first refusal re-
quired the owner to notify the rightholders of the impending sale
and to give them the opportunity to purchase the burdened prop-
erty at some fraction of the price the owner was willing to accept
for the entire package. 10 Without such notification a rightholder
may not exercise her privilege."' Under elementary principles of
contract law, however, a party who prevents the fulfillment of a
condition of their own obligation cannot rely on the non-occur-
rence of the condition to defeat his or her liability.1 2 In such cir-
cumstances, the non-occurrence of the condition is excused, and
performance of the contract is required. In the Brenner case, this
-meant the owner could not rely on her failure to fulfill her contrac-
105. Id.
106. Id. at 321-22.
107. Id. at 322.
108. Id. See supra note 29.
109. Brenner, 27 N.W.2d at 321-22.
110. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 245 cmt. a (1981); 3A CORBIN,
supra note 6, § 770 at 557; 5 WILLISTON, supra note 6, § 677 at 224-25.
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tual obligation-notifying the rightholders of the price she would
find acceptable for the burdened property-to prevent the
rightholders from exercising their privilege.113 Since the owner
failed to establish the price she would accept, the Supreme Court
of Michigan ruled that the rightholders were entitled to purchase
the burdened property for the value the owner would have as-
signed it, as determined by a court. 14
The Supreme Court of Michigan," 5 along with a significant mi-
nority of courts, award specific performance on the burdened prop-
113. This concept was communicated succinctly in Maron v. Howard, 66 Cal. Rptr.
70, 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) ("By making the appraisal impossible, defendant pre-
vented the determination of the purchase price by the method contemplated by the
contract .... A party who prevents fulfillment of a condition of his own obligation
commits a breach of contract and cannot rely on such condition to defeat his liability."
(citation omitted)).
114. Brenner, 27 N.W.2d at 322. The court established the mechanism for deter-
mining the purchase price at such fraction of $15,000 (the package-deal price) that
corresponded to the ratio of the burdened portion's value to the unburdened por-
tion's value. In other words, if the burdened portion of the package deal was worth
five-eighths the value of the unburdened portion, the rightholder would only pay
$9,375 ($15,000 51s) to exercise their right, regardless of the property's independent
market value. Other courts that have granted specific performance on the burdened
portion of a package deal give the rightholder an opportunity to purchase the bur-
dened property at its fair market value. See, e.g., Pantry Pride Enter., 806 F.2d at 1231
(remanding to district court for determination of rightholder's purchase price at bur-
dened property's fair market value); Wilson, 55 P.2d at 486, 488 (affirming trial
court's judgment, permitting rightholder to purchase burdened portion of package
deal at its "reasonable value"). See also Berry-Iverson, 242 N.W.2d at 135 ('In gen-
eral, we would agree with the courts which have concluded that a pro rata apportion-
ment of the purchase price to the smaller tract which a [rightholder] seeks to purchase
is not a proper measure of the purchase price of the smaller tract.").
115. The Brenner decision is terse, and does not expressly assert that the owner's
intention to sell the burdened property as part of a package deal is a manifestation of
her intention to sell the burdened property for the purpose of triggering the privilege.
It is plausible to argue that the Brenner decision based its holding on the peculiar
language of the right-of-first-refusal agreement in this case, which conditioned the
privilege's activation on the fact that the burdened property was to be sold rather
than on the owner's "intention" to sell it. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
The basis for the court's conclusion, however, is not clearly expressed in these terms
either. In addition, other courts that have addressed the package deal and right-0f-
first-refusal agreements similar to the one in Brenner make no such distinction. For
example, in Guaclides v. Kruse, the provision creating the right of first refusal read as
follow: "[In the event of a sale of the [burdened property] by the owners thereof,...
the [rightholder] shall have the option to purchase the said premises for the same
price as may be offered by a bona fide purchaser thereof." 170 A.2d at 492. The
Guaclides court went on to reject "the Michigan rule" on the grounds that "the at-
tempted sale of the whole tract for a single price is no indication of an intention or
desire to sell the [burdened] portion alone." Id. at 494. Moreover, a number of
courts have relied on Brenner in awarding specific performance on the burdened
property in the event of a package deal where the right of first refusal was expressly
contingent upon the owner's intention to sell. See, e.g., Berry-Iverson Co. of N.D.,
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erty on the theory that the owner's intention to sell the burdened
property as part of a package deal is a manifestation of the owner's
intention to sell the burdened property for the purpose of trigger-
ing the privilege.116 The Brenner decision provides the rationale
for this conclusion: even if the owner is only willing to accept an
offer for a number of properties sold together in one package, the
fact remains that the burdened property would be sold in such a
transaction. Certainly, as far as the rightholder is concerned, it
makes no difference if the burdened property is to be sold alone or
as part of a package deal.1 7 In either case, the rightholder would
expect to receive an opportunity to purchase the burdened prop-
erty. In addition, the Brenner decision notes that by accepting a
third party's offer for a package deal, the owner, herself, is respon-
sible for making it impossible to determine the price she would be
willing to accept for the burdened property alone. 18  Conse-
quently, the owner should not be allowed to prevent the
rightholder from exercising her privilege by arguing the price the
rightholder is to pay is undetermined; nor should the owner be
heard to complain that awarding specific performance denies her
the control she was to have in establishing that price.
Inc. v. Johnson, 242 N.W.2d 126, 128, 133 (N.D. 1976) (relying on Brenner as authority
for granting specific performance on the burdened property where the right of first
refusal was to be activated "at any time the owners desire to and are willing and able
to sell" the burdened property); Maron v. Howard, 66 Cal. Rptr. 70, 71, 79 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1968) (citing Brenner as support for award of specific performance on the bur-
dened property where owner sought to sell burdened property as part of a package
deal and right of first refusal's activation was conditioned on owner's "desire" to sell
burdened property).
116. See, e.g., Pantry Pride Enter. Inc., 630 F. Supp. at 640 ("We similarly conclude
that the intention to sell the leasehold interest and equipment where [only] the lease-
hold interest is protected by a right of first refusal, can be taken as the intention to sell
the leasehold interest.") (emphasis added); Berry-Iverson Co. of N.D., Inc., 242
N.W.2d at 134 ("[Wie conclude that an intention to sell the a larger parcel of land,
including [the burdened property], is evidence of an intention to sell the [burdened
property]."); Riley, 808 S.W.2d at 189 ("[U]nder the facts of this case, the trial court
erred in holding that a transfer of multiple condominiums, that includes the burdened
property, does not evince an intent to transfer the burdened condominium alone.").
117. See Continental Cablevision of N.E., Inc., 873 F.2d at 719 (Right of first refusal
implicated by sale of grandparent company because right of first refusal's objectives
"were as much affected by [sale of] stock in [the grandparent company] ... as by [a
sale of] stock in [the burdened company] itself"); Anderson, 473 P.2d at 89 ("[A]s far
as the [rightholders] were concerned, the [burdened property was] effectively 'sold'
and placed beyond their reach, regardless of the details of the [package deal] transac-
tion between the [owner] and [the third party].").
118. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
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A majority of courts disagree with the bases of the Brenner deci-
sion.119 Beyond the fundamental disagreement over the inference
to be drawn from the owner's willingness to accept a third party's
offer for a package deal, these courts contend that awarding spe-
cific performance on the burdened portion is contrary to the right
of first refusal's operation. 120 In addition, it requires courts to en-
gage in the inconvenient and inappropriate process of determining
the amount the rightholder must pay to exercise her privilege. 12 1
D. A Case For Monetary Relief
While rights of first refusal are thought to be enforceable
through both legal and equitable remedies, 22 only the Supreme
Court of Kansas, in Anderson v. Armour & Company,23 has up-
held an award of monetary damages where the burdened property
119. Ollie, 669 P.2d at 279-80 ("The majority view .... denies to the [rightholder]
specific performance for only the option-encumbered part of the whole property.");
Gyurkey, 651 P.2d at 933 ("[T]he majority rule.., denies the preemptive rightholder
the right to seek specific performance which would require the offering of the encum-
bered property to himself by the owner."); Myers, 189 N.W.2d at 576 ("[A] majority
of the courts which have considered the problem [of the package deal] have held that
the tenant cannot obtain specific performance in these situations.").
120. Myers, 189 N.W.2d at 576 ("We think that to grant specific performance of the
demised premises for their market value is to rewrite the [rightholder's] preferential
right. That right requires the [owners] ... to sell to the [rightholder] at the same price
and for which the [owner] would be willing to sell to any other person, not at the
market value.") (internal quotations omitted); see also Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1151
("To require specific performance on the [burdened property] for [the proportionate
value of the package] would .... require judicial reconstruction of the parties' con-
tract."); Guaclides, 170 A.2d at 494 ("In order to apportion [the value of the burdened
property to the package deal] a court would ... have to remake the parties' agree-
ment . . ").
121. Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1151 ("[Refusing to give specific performance] protects
... from problems and potential inequities which may result from deriving a value for
the smaller burdened tract by allocation, either proportionally.., or by some sort of
judicial determination of market value."); Traxler, 90 S.E.2d at 488 ("It is not for the
courts to undertake to apportion the fair value of the [burdened] lot to the amount at
which [the owner] proposed to sell both lots."); Guaclides, 170 A.2d at 494 ("In order
to apportion, a court would ... be forced either to indulge in the unwarranted as-
sumption that every acre of the parcel was of equal value, or to engage in the cumber-
some and invariably unsatisfactory task of weighing expert testimony on the
comparative values of the two parcels."). Contra Maron, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 79 ("Deter-
mination of the value of the property is a common task of courts in condemnation,
partition, and other proceedings. If equitable considerations support the position of
one who seeks specific performance, particularly if he has previously changed his po-
sition in reliance on the contractual right that he seeks to enforce, courts of equity will
assume the task of ascertaining the consideration if it has become impossible of ascer-
tainment by the method provided in the contract.").
122. See 1A CORBIN supra note 6, at 471.
123. 473 P.2d 84 (Kan. 1970).
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was sold as part of a package deal. 124 In 1963, Armour purchased a
30-acre portion of a 40-acre tract of land and leased the west 13.75
acres to K.T., Russ and Robert Anderson for a term of five years.
The Andersons, having previously leased the property from the
preceding owner, had been long-time tenants of the land, which
they used for their large-scale cattle-feeding operation. Conse-
quently, the property Armour purchased contained improvements
and equipment owned and placed by the Andersons at their ex-
pense. Among other provisions, the Armour-Anderson lease
agreement contained the following:
In the event the Lessor desires to sell the premises, the Lessor
agrees to notify the Lessee in writing of such intention and of
the purchase price and shall allow Lessee fifteen (15) days from
day of mailing such notice within which to attempt to negotiate
a purchase and sale contract for the premises with the Lessor.
125
On November 29, 1967, Armour conveyed all 30 acres to Iowa
Beef Packers, Inc. in a transaction that included an exchange of
properties. The Andersons, however, were not notified of the con-
veyance until four months later when Armour informed them that
its lease had been assigned to Iowa Beef. Subsequently, the
Andersons filed suit against Armour for monetary damages. Spe-
cifically, the Andersons claimed that Armour's failure to provide
them with an opportunity to purchase the burdened property con-
stituted a breach of the lease agreement which caused them dam-
ages totalling $75,000. A jury trial resulted in a verdict against
Armour in the amount of $25,000.126 Upon review, the Supreme
Court of Kansas upheld the award.127 It found that the quoted
lease provision gave the Andersons "a pre-emptive right to
purchase" that "ripened into an enforceable contract right" when
Armour decided to sell. 12s In addition, the Supreme Court held
that if the preemptive right was intended to be inapplicable in the
event of the package deal, it was dependent upon the owners, who
prepared the agreement, to state so expressly.129 Furthermore, the
fact that the conveyance to the third party involved an exchange of
properties did not frustrate the right's application because "as far
as the Andersons were concerned the 13.75 acres were effectively
124. Id. at 89.
125. Id. at 86.
126. Id. at 86-87 and 123.
127. Id. at 89.
128. Anderson, 473 P.2d at 88.
129. Id. at 89.
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'sold' and placed beyond their reach regardless of the details of the
transaction between Armour and Iowa [Beef].113 0 Finally, the
court held that had the rightholders been given an opportunity to
buy the burdened property, they could have purchased the land at
its fair market value without the improvements which they already
owned. Consequently, the damages awarded by the jury, which
were determined by deducting the value of the tract without im-
provements from the value of the tract with improvements, were
entirely appropriate.' 3
The Anderson decision is conspicuously void of discussion con-
cerning the approach other courts have taken in the event of a
package deal. Nevertheless, from the rationale employed in the
Anderson decision, 32 it is clear that Kansas rejects the view taken
by a majority of jurisdictions, namely that the sale of the burdened
property as part of a larger package of properties does not activate
the right of first refusal. 33 In addition, there is nothing in the
Anderson decision to suggest that the Supreme Court of Kansas
thought that only monetary damages are available. Instead, it is
apparent that the Supreme Court of Kansas aligns itself with those
jurisdictions that contend the package deal does activate the right
of first refusal, so as to require an owner who is contemplating such
a transaction to offer the burdened portion alone to the rightholder
at its fair market value.13 4 Consequently, it would be repetitive to
discuss the arguments for and against the result reached by the
Kansas Supreme Court, as these arguments have already been
made above in the discussion of the Brenner decision. 135 Presuma-
bly, the only reason the rightholders in Anderson did not receive
relief in the form of specific performance on the burdened prop-
erty alone is that they only asked for monetary damages. 36 There
130. Id.
131. Id. This calculation yields standard expectation damages. The owner of
course cannot argue that there is no proof that the rightholders would have exercised
their privilege. That factor is unknown only because of the owner's own failure to
comply with the preemption agreement. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying
text.
132. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1151; Crow-Spieker #23, 731 P.2d at 350; Olie,,
669 P.2d at 281; Gyurkey, 651 P.2d at 932; Myers, 189 N.W.2d at 576; Straley, 278 A.2d
at 70; New Ad. Garden, 194 N.Y.S. at 40; Guaclides, 170 A.2d at 494.
134. See supra Part HC and note 114.
135. See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
136. Anderson, 473 P.2d at 89. Cf. Thomas & Son Transfer Line, Inc., 574 P.2d at
111 (asserting monetary damages are inadequate substitute for specific performance
on the burdened property where burdened property was essential to operation of
rightholder's business).
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is nothing in the Anderson decision to suggest that specific per-
formance on the burdened property would not have been an
equally appropriate remedy had the rightholder only asked for it.
In fact, in many cases where the rightholder is not leasing the bur-
dened property and is, therefore, unlikely to make improvements
to it, monetary damages would not be easily determinable, and
such relief would not be sought.137 Ultimately, if the package deal
entitles, the rightholder to specific performance, 38 the rightholder
would be entitled to monetary damages as an alternative as well.139
E. A Case For Specific Performance On The Entire Package
Among the courts that hold that the package deal triggers the
right of first refusal, most agree that the privilege is activated with
respect to the burdened portion of the package alone. 4 ° Another
view is that when a right of first refusal is activated by the owner's
intention to accept a third party's offer for a package deal, the
rightholder's privilege embraces the entire package. In other
words, if the owner is prepared to accept a third party's offer for
the burdened property as part of a package deal, the rightholder's
privilege entitles her to preempt the entire sale. If the owner fails
to provide the rightholder. with an opportunity to purchase the en-
tire package before selling to'the third party, the rightholder may
seek specific performance of her privilege, requiring the owner to
provide her with an opportunity to purchase the entire package at
the same price and upon the same terms as the owner is willing to
accept from the third party.
Such specific performance on the entire package was adopted by
the New York State Supreme Court in Tompkins County in
Capalongo v. Giles. 4' In that case, Sydney and Doris Giles gave
137. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Galey, 458 P.2d 650 (Wyo. 1969); Anasae Realty Corp. v.
Firestone, 478 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
138. See generally, EDWARD YORIO, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT § 10.2.1 at 264-65
and § 12.2.1 at 312-13 (1989) (discussing tendency to award specific performance of
rights of first refusal burdening real estate and securities).
139. Id. § 1.3 ("[T]he normal remedy for breach of contract ... [is] monetary dam-
ages."); Anthony J. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 354
(1978).
140. See, e.g., Pantry Pride Enters., Inc., 630 F. Supp. at 640; Berry-Iverson, 242
N.W.2d at 134; Anderson, 473 P.2d at 89; Denco, 97 So.2d at 265; Brenner, 27 N.W.2d
at 322; Riley, 808 S.W.2d at 189.
141. 425 N.Y.S.2d 225, 228 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Capalongo v. Desch, 438 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), aff'd, 443 N.E.2d 491
(1982).
The same interpretation of the effect of a package deal upon a right of first refusal
appears to have been reached by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in First
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Peter and Sandra Capalongo a right of first refusal on a triangular
plot of land that lay adjacent to the Capalongos' property.142
Nearly eight years later, a third party offered to purchase a 123-
acre parcel of land from the Capalongos, a portion of which in-
cluded the burdened plot.'4 3 The Gileses offered the Capalongos
an opportunity to purchase the entire package on the same terms
as specified in the third-party offer. Before the Capalongos ac-
cepted, however, the owners executed a contract with the third
party.'" The Capalongos filed suit, seeking rescission of the sale to
Nat'l Exch. Bank v. Roanoke Oil Co., Inc. 192 S.E. 764 (Va. 1937). In that case, the
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's order compelling an owner who
sought to sell burdened property as part of a larger parcel to convey the entire parcel
to the rightholder. Id. at 772, 776. Subsequent courts addressing the issue of the
package deal, however, contend the Virginia decision never addressed the effect of
the package deal upon the rightholder's privilege. For example, in Atlantic Refining
Co., 51 A.2d at 724, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained that the First Nat'l
Exch. Bank decision rested on the grounds that the owner in fact offered the larger
parcel to the rightholder and the rightholder accepted that offer. A similar-but in-
verted-explanation was provided in Guaclides, 170 A.2d at 496. In Guaclides, the
court explained that the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia's affirmance was
based on the fact that the rightholder offered to purchase the entire parcel and the
owner accepted that offer. These explanations are insupportable. The trial court in
First Nat'l Exch. Bank had expressly ruled that the right of first refusal required the
owner to give the rightholder the opportunity to match any acceptable offer affecting
the burdened property. 192 S.E. at 769. In affirming, the Supreme Court of Appeals
stated:
The interpretation of the contract [creating the right of first refusal] by the
trial court, under the evidence and the circumstances in this case, is fair and
reasonable. Out of the conflict of the evidence there is sufficient to support
that interpretation, which also seems to be in harmony with the original un-
derstanding of the parties as expressed by their own actions.
Id. at 771 (emphasis added). At best, it could be said that the First Nat'l Exch. Bank
court merely held that if the rightholder wishes to exercise her right of first refusal on
the entire parcel, she may do so, but that the court did not reach the question of
whether the rightholder loses her right completely if she fails to do so. Pantry Pride
Enter., Inc. v. Stop & Shop Companies, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 637, 639 (E.D. Va.), modi-
fied, 806 F.2d 1227 (4th Cir. 1986).
142. The provisions creating the privilege read as follows:
[11n the event the [owners] decide to sell the parcel, the [owners] do hereby
agree to first offer to sell said parcel to the [rightholders], before any and all
others.
That in the event any third party offers to purchase said parcel from the
[owners], the [owners] do agree to then give the [rightholders] a chance to
match said offer within ten days after notifying the [rightholders] of said
offer, and the [rightholders], if they notify the [owners] in writing of their
willingness to match said offer, shall complete the purchase of same within
thirty days thereafter.
Capalongo v. Desch, 438 N.Y.S. 638, 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), aff'd, 443 N.E.2d 491
(1982).
143. Giles, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
144. Id.
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the third party and an order that the entire property be conveyed
to them or, if the Gileses could not give them a marketable title,
monetary damages. 45
At the outset, the Tompkins County court explained that at the
time the owners accepted the third party's offer, the third party was
aware of the rightholder's privilege on the burdened plot. 46 The
court reasoned that the third party was not a bona fide purchaser
because the right of first refusal required the owner, "as a matter of
law," to give the rightholders an opportunity to purchase the entire
123-acre parcel. 47
The Tompkins County court discussed a series of New York Ap-
pellate Division cases addressing the package deal and reaching in-
congruous results. The court then stated:
[A] better analysis of the situation presented here and in similar
situations is that where an owner does have an offer from a third
party to purchase a piece on which he has given a first refusal
option, but on terms which specify inclusion of the piece in a
larger parcel, that he thereupon has a duty to offer the whole
parcel to the [rightholder] on the same terms.148
The Tompkins County Court touted its solution as giving the
rightholder "as much protection as in all fairness he has a right to
expect" and "impos[ing] no burden or hardship on the owner as,
whoever becomes the ultimate purchaser, he receives the same
compensation."'' 49 This language suggests that the court's rationale
is premised on a view of the package deal simply as a condition to
the sale of the burdened property. The nature of a right of first
refusal is such that it merely provides the rightholder with the op-
portunity to purchase the burdened property on the same terms
and conditions as a third party is willing to offer for it.150 There-
fore, requiring a rightholder, who wishes to exercise her right of
first refusal on the burdened portion, to purchase the entire pack-
age is consistent with the rightholder's expectations. It is not any
different from other unconventional terms such as requiring the
rightholder to exercise her privilege by entering into a partnership
agreement or exchanging parcels of land rather than paying cash.' 5'
The Giles court's rationale is that by entering into an agreement
145. Id.
146. Id. at 227.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Giles, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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that allows a third party's offer to set the price and conditions for
the sale of the burdened property, the rightholder assumes the risk
of receiving a condition of sale that is unconventional or unique. 152
In the instance of the package deal, the unconventional condition
happens to be the purchase of additional property. So long as that
condition is commercially reasonable, made in good faith and not
specifically designed to defeat the right of first refusal, the
rightholder should be required to match the condition if she wishes
to exercise her prerogative. 153 Under this analysis, specific per-
formance on the entire package comports with the nature and op-
eration of ordinary right-of-first-refusal agreements and the
expectations of the parties.
Specific performance on the entire package as a solution to the
package deal has been expressly rejected by other courts either (i)
because its practical effect is to allow the owner to destroy every
right of first refusal by including the burdened property in a pack-
age deal54 or, (ii) because, it gives the rightholder more than she
bargained for. 55 The former views specific performance on the en-
tire package as unfair to the rightholder. The latter views this solu-"
tion as unfair to the owner.
The potential for harm to the rightholder is obvious. If the
owner could include the burdened property as part of a package
and force the rightholder to accept the entire package or forfeit her
privilege, then the owner could simply nullify every right of first
refusal by combining the burdened property with items that the
rightholder may not want or cannot afford.'56 This criticism recog-
nizes that the condition contemplated, and the risk undertaken, by
entering into a right-of-first-refusal agreement relates specifically
to the type of consideration to be paid (cash, securities, property or
a particular finger ring) 157 and the method of its payment (one
lump sum or in installments over time).'58 While it is true that en-
tering into an ordinary right-of-first-refusal agreement means ac-
152. Brown, supra note 14, at 176 and n.144 ("Considering all the variable terms,
besides the price, involved in a contract, the right holder is taking a great risk of being
faced with the choice of an onerous contract or losing the land.").
153. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
154. See. e.g., Pantry Pride Enter., Inc., 806 F.2d at 1229; Radio Webs, Inc., 292
S.E.2d at 715
155. See, e.g., Atlantic Refining Co., 51 A.2d 719, at 723; New Atd. Garden, Inc., 194
N.Y.S. at 39-40; Guaclides, 170 A.2d at 493.
156. Pantry Pride Enter., Inc., 806 F.2d at 1229.
157. See Prince, 649 P.2d at 824.
158. See Radio Webs, Inc., 292 S.E.2d at 714 (asserting that terms and conditions
contemplated by right of first refusal pertains to possibility of "deferred payments and
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cepting the risk of an unconventional or unique condition to
exercising the right, the rightholder contemplates a condition that
will relate to the value of the property and not a collateral agree-
ment that is wholly unrelated to the burdened property.159 There-
fore, awarding specific performance on the entire package does not
comport with the right of first refusal's operation. And permitting
the right of.first refusal to be rendered a nullity by the addition of
items the rightholder may not want or cannot afford does not pro-
vide the rightholder with as much protection as she has a right to
expect.
Specific performance on the entire package in the event of a
package deal poses problems of unfairness to the owner as well.
As the cases expressly rejecting specific performance on the entire
package reveal, often it is the owner, rather than the rightholder,
who argues'against such relief. 6° From the owner's perspective, an
expansion of the right of first refusal's reach is detrimental because
property burdened by such rights suffers from a deflated value and
inferior marketability. 16 1 Entitling the rightholder to specific per-
formance on the entire package permits the right of first refusal's
influence to reach beyond its bargained-for parameters, imposing a
significant burden on the owner. Consequently, most courts that
reject specific performance on the entire package do so because
security for those payments," not terms and conditions, such as a package deal, that
are "wholly unrelated to the purchase of [the burdened company]").
159. Ollie, 669 P.2d at 281 (characterizing the "addition of terms and conditions"
such as those contained in a package deal as "wholly unrelated" to the burdened
property); Radio Webs, Inc., 292 S.E.2d at 714 ("The parties agreed that the price and
other terms and conditions, such as possible deferred payments and security for those
payments, were to be supplied by the offer of a third party .... To now add 'terms
and conditions' such as [a package deal] does not satisfy [rightholder's] right of first
refusal and is not a bona fide offer within the meaning of the agreement.").
160. See, e.g., Atlantic Refining Co., 51 A.2d at 723; New Atl. Garden, Inc., 194
N.Y.S. at 39-40; Guaclides, 170 A.2d at 493.
161. Ferrero Constr. Co., 536 A.2d at 1144 ("[Mlany prospective purchasers, recog-
nizing that a matching offer from the [rightholderj will defeat their bids, simply will
not bid on the property. This in turn will depress the property's value and discourage
the owner from attempting to sell."). See also Winter v. Skoglund, 404 N.W.2d 786,
791 (Minn. 1987) ("[A]s a practical matter, a right of first refusal imposes a significant
burden on the marketability of corporate shares."); Stanley Rosenberg and Sanford J.
Schlesinger, The Benefits of Family Limited Partnerships in Estate Planning, N.Y. ST.
B.J., Nov. 1994, at 25-26 (characterizing rights of first refusal as "negative factors"
that permit discounts for lack of marketability in valuing limited partnership interest
for gift tax purposes).
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such relief provides the rightholder with an undeserved windfall,
not because it is unfair to the rightholder1 62
IH. The Package Deal Default Rule
As the preceding material indicates, when an owner is prepared
to sell a number of properties, one of which is burdened by a right
of first refusal, courts rely on a variety of factors in determining the
relief to which a rightholder is entitled. Because right-of-first-re-
fusal agreements tend neither to provide for this contingency ex-
pressly, nor to use language from which to deduce the intention of
the parties,'163 courts primarily base there holdings on generally ac-
cepted rules related to the nature and operation of rights of first
refusal.164  Unfortunately, these approaches have led courts to
choose from among five different forms of relief with little consis-
tency 65 and even less uniformity. 66 As a result, parties to right-of-
first-refusal agreements cannot be certain of the legal conse-
quences of the package deal unless they anticipate and expressly
provide for this disruptive contingency. Further, so long as parties
to right-of-first-refusal agreements continue to omit terms that
would account for a package deal, the need for a uniform judicial
approach to the package deal will persist. 167
162. See, e.g., Atlantic Refining Co., 51 A.2d at 723 ("[Rightholder's] privilege of
purchasing [burdened property] in specified circumstances cannot reasonably be
stretched into an enforceable right to purchase a plot of increased size not described
in the option."); New AtI. Garden, Inc., 194 N.Y.S. at 39-40 ("By no possible interpre-
tation could the parties be said to have contemplated by [the right of first refusal]
provision any other premises than those [specified] to the [rightholder] under said
[agreement]."); Guaclides, 170 A.2d at 493 ("As the trial court here properly pointed
out, a preemptive right to purchase a part only of the whole does not give a preemp-
tive right to purchase the whole. To rule otherwise would be a judicial remolding of
the contract without legal authority.").
163. See, e.g., Chapman, 800 P.2d at 1150; Thomas & Son Transfer Line, Inc., 574
P.2d at 109; Brenner, 27 N.W.2d at 321.
164. See, e.g., supra notes 81-86, 116-18, 150-53 and their accompanying text.
165. See supra note 45.
166. Compare Berry-Iverson Co., of N.D., Inc., 242 N.W.2d at 134 (awarding spe-
cific performance on the burdened property) with Ollie, 669 P.2d at 281 (preventing
the owner from entering into a package deal); compare also Crow-Spieker #23, 731
P.2d at 350 (denying any relief) with Giles, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 229 (awarding specific
performance on the entire package), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Capalongo v.
Desch, 438 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), aff'd, 443 N.E.2d 491 (1982).
167. More recent case law reveals two examples of attempts to contract for the
package deal (one successful; one not). In Sawyer v. Firestone, a potential buyer ob-
tained a contract to purchase containing an ordinary right-of-first-refusal clause. 513
A.2d 36, 37 (R.I. 1986). However, before closing, the owner altered the right of first
refusal agreement so that it was contingent upon the sale of the burdened property
"as a separate parcel." Id. at 37. This alteration was held to be a breach of contract,
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In order to attain a uniform solution to the problems posed by
the package deal, the process used until now by the courts in deter-
mining the effect of the package deal on the rightholder's privilege
must be abandoned. Courts currently rely on the process of con-
tract interpretation, 68 extrapolating a solution from the language
used to create the privilege or from generally accepted rules relat-
ing to the privilege's nature and operation.169 A uniform solution
is possible only if courts recognize that the package deal is neither
contemplated by the language of ordinary right-of-first refusal
agreements, nor the generally applicable rules regarding such privi-
leges. Consequently, a judicially-supplied term-fashioned from
the principles of fairness and efficiency-is necessary to determine
the effect of the package deal upon the rightholder's privilege. 70
The process by which a court supplies a term for a missing contin-
gency is distinct from the process of contract interpretation. 17' By
submitting to this process, a single solution to the questions posed
by the package deal becomes apparent. 172
An impressive nomenclature has developed for judicially and
legislatively supplied terms. 73 In the current fashion, however,
they are termed "default rules.' 74 Such rules dictate the rights of
the parties unless the parties, by express provision, manifest a con-
entitling the potential purchaser to rescission. Id. at 40. A more successful attempt to
contract for the package deal appears in Continental Cablevision of N.E., Inc., where
the right of first refusal was made contingent upon transfer of stock made "either
directly or indirectly." 873 F.2d at 718 n.3. Sale of the burdened company's grandpar-
ent stock was held to activate the right of first refusal. Id. at 719.
168. See generally 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.7
(1990) (describing process of contract interpretation).
169. See supra notes 81-86, 116-18, 150-53 and their accompanying text.
170. See generally 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 168, § 7.16 (describing process by
which courts supply contract terms).
171. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 168, § 7.16.
172. Judicially-created default rules are found throughout the law of Contracts.
See, e.g., Beth A. Eisler, Default Rules for Contract Formation By Promise and the
Need for Revision of the Mailbox Rule, 79 Ky. L.J. 557 (1991).
173. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (Supplied terms "have
alternatively been termed background, backstop, enabling, fallback, gap-filling, off-
the-rack, opt-in, opt-out, preformulated, preset, presumptive, standby, standard-form
and suppletory rules.").
174. Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Con-
sent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 826 (1992) ("The rhetoric of default rules is in the process of
becoming the terminology of choice for contract theorists."); Ayres & Gertner, supra
note 173, at n.24. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the
Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989); Jules L. Coleman, et. al., A
Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract
Law, 12 HARV. J. LAW & PUB. POL'Y 639 (1989);
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trary intention. 175 Commentators recognize three sources of con-
tractual incompleteness that give rise to the application of default
rules. First, some contingencies are not addressed because the par-
ties fail to foresee them.176 Second, other contingencies are omit-
ted for pragmatic reasons. These are usually foreseeable (and
foreseen) contingencies that are either unlikely to occur or too del-
icate to risk negotiating over.177 In such situations, the parties may
simply conclude that the cost of contracting for such a contingency
outweighs its benefits. 178 Three, omissions may be the result of one
or more parties' purposeful concealment of information for strate-
gic reasons. 179
To some extent, the appropriate default rule in any given situa-
tion is dependent upon the reason the parties failed to contract for
the missing term themselves.18 0 In broad terms, default rules either
(1) allocate risks upon the party better able to insure against
175. Barnett, supra note 174, at 825 ("[D]efault rules are binding in the absence of
manifested assent to the contrary... ."); Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Tradi-
tions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1703, 1706 n.11 (1989);
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 173, at 87; Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law,
46 U. Prrr. L. REV. 75, 122-23 (1984); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles
of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1981).
176. Parties may simply fail to perceive the need to supply the term out of haste,
inadvertence, or because the term concerns a contingency too remote for them to
have contemplated. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 168, § 7.15, at 301; Barnett, supra
note 174, at 822; see generally Goetz & Scott supra note 175 (discussing the special
problems of identifying future conditions in relational contracts).
177. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 168, § 7.15 at 300; Ayres and Gertner, supra note
173, at 92.
178. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 168, § 7.15 at 300; Barnett, supra note 174, at 822
("Many foreseeable contingencies, given their low probability, are better left unnego-
tiated ex ante in the hopes that they will not materialize or will be handled coopera-
tively ex post if they do."); Ayres and Gertner, supra note 173, at 92; Steven Shavell,
Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 477 (1980) ("[I1f the
probability of a contingency (or class of contingencies-an event) is low, then it may
be less costly in the expected sense for the parties to resolve difficulties only on the
chance that they arise than to bear with certainty the costs of providing for the contin-
gency in the contract."). Professors Ayres and Gertner provide a terse but compre-
hensive list of possible transaction costs that may persuade parties from explicitly
contracting for a given contingency. The list of transaction costs include: "[(i)] legal
fees, [(ii)] negotiation costs, [(iii)] drafting and printing costs, [and (iv)] the costs of
researching the effects and probability of a contingency." Ayres & Gertner, supra
note 173 at 92-93.
179. A party may withhold information to increase her share of the contract's ex-
pected benefits. Barnett, supra note 174, at 822. See generally Jason S. Johnston,
Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE
L.J. 615 (1990) (detailed analysis of strategic omissions); Ayres & Gertner, supra note
173 (introducing strategic considerations as a source of contractual incompleteness).
180. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 173, at 127.
THE PACKAGE DEAL
them,'8 1(2) provide for what the parties generally would have
agreed to, 8 2 or (3) compel parties to reveal information. 8 3 Except
where strategic considerations are the source of contractual incom-
pleteness, 4 the central goal of any default rule is to reduce the
cost of contract negotiations by supplying a term that the parties
would have agreed to themselves; or more accurately stated, one
which they would not be likely to have circumvented with an ex-
press provision to the contrary.18 5 By providing a rule that the par-
ties are not likely to contract around, the court allows the parties to
continue to rely on the pragmatic considerations that led them to
omit the missing term in the first place.
There is nothing to indicate that the regular omission of a term
addressing the package deal from right-of-first-refusal agreements
is the result of strategic considerations. Nor is the package deal
contingency so unlikely as to be entirely unforeseeable. In all like-
lihood, the reason parties to right-of-first-refusal agreements con-
tinue to omit a provision addressing the possibility of a package
deal is because the time and money needed to research the effect
and probability of a package deal and to negotiate and draft a spe-
cial provision for its occurrence outweighs the benefits of having
such a provision. At the time the parties are drafting the right-of-
first-refusal agreement, the possibility of a package deal, or at least
a dispute arising from one, is likely to seem improbable. More-
over, because right-of-first-refusal agreements are often merely an-
cillary provisions within more complex agreements, 86 only a small
portion of the transaction resources-the time and money needed
* 181. See generally Goetz & Scott, supra note 175 (describing implied terms as
"standard or common risk allocations"); Richard A. Posner and Andrew M. Rosen-
field, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977) (explaining the doctrines of "impossibility", "impracticabil-
ity", and "frustration" in terms of risk allocation).
182. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 173, at 89-90 (listing commentators that "have
championed the 'would have wanted' theory" for default.rules); see also 2 FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 168, § 7.16 at 305-08.
183. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 173, at 97-100 (arguing that in some situations
"penalty defaults" should be employed to encourage parties to contract around the
default rule).
184. See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 173 (arguing that "penalty de-
faults," compelling parties to contract around the default, should be utilized where
strategic considerations are the source of contractual incompleteness).
185. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 168, § 7.16 at 307-08; Ayres & Gertner, supra
note 173, at 93; Goetz & Scott, supra note 175, at 270; Posner & Rosenfield, supra
note 180, at 88; see also Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and
the Law of Contract, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5-6 (1978).
186. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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to research the effect and probability of a contingency and to nego-
tiate and draft for it-will ordinarily be allocated to such secondary
provisions. Even in circumstances where sufficient transaction re-
sources are allocated to draft a package-deal contingency, the par-
ties may be reluctant to negotiate and draft such a provision for
fear that the negotiating and drafting process will either delay the
execution of the primary agreement or, worse, lead to an impasse
that will undo the primary agreement entirely.187 Pragmatic con-
siderations, then, are the most probable cause for the continued
omission of a provision addressing the possibility of a package deal
in right-of-first-refusal agreements."m As the material in Part II
reveals, where parties to a right-of-first-refusal agreement fail to
provide for the possibility of a package deal, there is no solution to
the questions posed by the owner's willingness to enter into such a
transaction that will comport with the parties' expectations com-
pletely. In choosing a default rule, however, it is only necessary to
determine which of the possible solutions satisfies enough of the
parties' expectations to dissuade them from incurring the ineffi-
cient transaction costs that are necessary to provide expressly for a
package-deal contingency. 189
The different solutions to the package deal that have already
been adopted by various courts under a contract-interpretation
analysis make the possibilities for a package-deal default rule evi-
dent. One possible default rule, reflecting the holdings of Chap-
man190 and a majority of courts under a contract-interpretation
analysis,1 91 is that the owner may not enter into an agreement to
sell the burdened property as part of a package deal at all. Under
this rule, the rightholder would be entitled to an injunction, barring
the owner from attempting to sell the burdened property as part of
a package deal. Further, if the owner executed the sale of the bur-
dened property as part of a package deal, the rightholder would be
entitled to an order requiring the third party to reconvey the bur-
dened property to the owner and enjoining the owner from selling
187. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 168, § 7.16 at 305. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Fire-
stone, 513 A.2d 36, 37 (R.I. 1986) (seller's attempt to include a package-deal provision
in contract to purchase real estate led to the buyer's rescission of the entire contract).
188. See Shavell, supra note 178 at 468 ("[B]ecause of the costs involved in enumer-
ating and bargaining over contractual obligations under the full range of relevant con-
tingencies, it is normally impractical to make contracts which approach
completeness.").
189. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
190. 800 P.2d 1147 (Wyo. 1992).
191. For discussion see supra Part liB.
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the burdened property except in response to an offer for the bur-
dened property alone.
A second possible default rule, mirroring the holdings of Bren-
ner 92 and a significant minority of courts,193 is to allow the owner
to enter into an agreement to sell the burdened property as part of
a package deal, but to require her to give the rightholder an oppor-
tunity to purchase the burdened portion of the package at a rea-
sonable price before she may execute the sale to the third party. If
the owner sells the burdened property as part of a package deal
without providing the rightholder an opportunity to purchase the
burdened portion, the rightholder would be entitled to specific per-
formance of her privilege or, where assessable, monetary damages.
A third possible rule, modeled upon the Giles decision, 194 is to
allow the owner to enter into an agreement to sell the burdened
property as part of a package deal, but to require her to give the
rightholder an opportunity to purchase all of the properties in the
package deal before executing the sale to the third party. The
rightholder, in turn, will only be able to exercise her privilege and
prevent the sale of the package to the third party if she agrees to
purchase the entire package for the price and under the terms con-
tained in the third-party offer. If the owner sells the burdened
property as part of a package deal without providing the
rightholder an opportunity to purchase the entire package, the
rightholder would be entitled to specific performance of her privi-
lege or, where assessable, monetary damages. 95
Finally, a possible default rule, reflecting the holding in Crow-
Spieker #23,196 is to permit the owner to sell the burdened property
as part of a package deal and leave the rightholder without any
remedy at all.
Of all these solutions, the one most likely to keep the parties to a
right-of-first-refusal agreement from incurring the transaction costs
necessary to provide for the package-deal contingency expressly is
the second Brenner-like rule. This solution would allow the owner
192. 27 N.W.2d 320 (Mich. 1947).
193. For discussion see supra Part IC.
194. 425 N.Y.S.2d 225 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Capalongo v. Desch, 438 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), aff'd, 443 N.E.2d 491
(1982). For discussion see supra Part TiE.
195. Other solutions, mirroring the second and the third possible default rules but
limiting the rightholder to monetary damages alone, are not considered because mon-
etary damages for a breach of a right-of-first-refusal agreement are often not readily
assessable.
196. 731 P.2d 348 (Nev. 1987). For discussion see supra Part IIA.
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to enter into an agreement to sell the burdened property as part of
a package deal, but to require her to give the rightholder an oppor-
tunity to purchase the burdened portion of the package deal before
executing the sale. If the owner sold the burdened property as part
of a package deal without first providing the rightholder an oppor-
tunity to purchase the burdened portion, the rightholder would be
entitled to specific performance of her privilege or, where assessa-
ble, monetary damages.
This approach would significantly satisfy the expectations of the
owner and the rightholder. It would serve both purposes for which
rights of first refusal are created: (i) discouraging the sale, of the
burdened property and (ii) affording the rightholder the opportu-
nity to purchase the burdened property should the owner ever de-
cide to sell it.19 7 The rule discourages the sale of the burdened
property by permitting a third party's contract for. a package deal
to be preempted in part.198 Negotiations to purchase property
carry expense and effort that a third party will be less willing to
expend where there is a potential for frustration by preemption.199
This rule also serves the privilege's purpose of enabling, the
rightholder to buy the burdened property by providing the
rightholder with such an opportunity even if the owner is only able
to obtain an offer for a package deal.2°° In addition, this rule gives
the owner the freedom to market her property in the manner she
sees fit, including as part of a package of properties.
Concededly, neither party will be entirely satisfied with the ef-
fects of the proposed default rule. The owner will be dissatisfied
with the rule because the requirement that she offer the burdened
property to the rightholder before selling it as part of a package
deal means that the owner stands to lose the opportunity to sell her
property in the same manner she saw fit to market it. The
rightholder will be dissatisfied with the default rule because per-
mitting the owner to establish the price the rightholder is pay to
exercise her privilege denies the rightholder of the benefit of hav-
ing a third party establish that price.20 1 A third-party offer for the
burdened property, taking the risk of preemption into account,
197. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
199. See Ferrero Constr. Co., 536 A.2d at 1144 ("[Mjany prospective purchasers,
recognizing that a matching offer from the [rightholder] will defeat their bids, simply
will not bid on the property.").
200. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
201. Even these concessions may be within the parameters of the parties expecta-
tions. See generally Stutzman & Day, supra note 14 at 293-94 (arguing that requiring
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would likely be less than the reasonable price the owner will re-
quest. Nevertheless, as the following paragraph indicates, these
concessions are minor in comparison to the consequences under
any of the other possible package-deal default rules. It is worth
reiterating that the appropriate default rule need not conform to
the parties' expectations completely; it simply must provide the
least incentive for the parties to right-of-first-refusal agreements to
contract for the missing contingency expressly. Provisions address-
ing the package deal are omitted because it is impractical and inef-
ficient to negotiate and draft for such a contingency. 2 2 Therefore,
a default rule that allows the parties to rely on the practical reasons
that led them to omit the term and does not induce them to incur
the risks and costs of negotiating and drafting for the possibility of
a package deal is the most economically efficient rule.
Denying the rightholder any relief in the event of a package deal
is an untenable -default rule. If the rightholder failed to contract
around this rule, the owner would have the ability to render the
privilege meaningless simply by attaching unburdened items to the
burdened property and offering the resulting package for sale.203
Under thisrule, the rightholder's failure to account for the possibil-
ity of a package deal would lead to the evisceration of her privi-
lege. Consequently, the rightholder would have a powerful
incentive to contract around the rule and provide for the package-
deal contingency expressly. The same is true, even if to a lesser
extent, of a default rule that would require an owner to give the
rightholder an opportunity to purchase the entire package. Such a
rule only permits the rightholder to exercise her privilege if she is
capable of purchasing the entire package for the price and under
the terms contained in the third-party offer. The result is that the
owner could render the rightholder's privilege meaningless simply
by combining the burdened property with a cluster of items the
rightholder may not want or cannot afford.201 On the other hand,
if a default rule prohibiting the owner from ever selling the bur-
dened property as part of a package deal were adopted, the owner
would have a strong incentive to provide for the possibility of a
package deal expressly. The owner's failure to obtain a provision
allowing her to seek offers for a package deal may prevent her
the owner to offer the burdened property to the rightholder at a reasonable price
before selling as part of a package deal satisfies the expectations of the parties).
202. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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from ever selling the burdened property.2 °5 This is especially true
where the value or usefulness of the property is or becomes inextri-
cably tied to other properties. In addition, this rule limits the
rightholder's opportunities for purchasing the burdened prop-
erty;2°6 such an opportunity is one of the reasons rights of first re-
fusal are created.20 7
The adoption of a judicially-created default rule allowing the
owner to sell the burdened property as part of a package deal only
after providing the rightholder with an opportunity to purchase the
burdened portion of the package deal, would be beneficial because
it will put future parties to right-of-first-refusal agreements on no-
tice of the effect a package deal would have on their rights.20 8 This
default rule would also remove the potential for arbitrary deci-
sions, by establishing a single result in all instances where a prop-
erty burdened by a right of first refusal is sold as part of a larger
package of properties. 20 9 Moreover, though the proposed default
rule does not remove every incentive to contract for the possibility
of the package deal expressly, it does alleviate the more significant
reasons for doing so. This default rule would serve every purpose
for which the rights of first refusal are created,1 0 without denying
the owner the possibility of selling the burdened property as part of
a package deal. In addition, it would not provide the owner with a
mechanism with which to render the rightholder's privilege mean-
ingless. The incentive for drafting around this default rule is mini-
mal. Any incentive that remains, is exceedingly less than the
incentives supplied by the other possible default rules.
Conclusion
A persistent problem in right-of-first-refusal jurisprudence has
been the effect of an acceptable third-party offer for a package of
properties, a portion of which is burdened. In determining the ef-
fect of such package deals, courts have primarily relied on princi-
ples related to the nature and operation of rights of first refusal.
Unfortunately, this approach has led different courts to reach dis-
parate and inconsistent results.
205. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
208. See Seita, supra note 175, at 123.
209. Id.
210. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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The problems posed by the package deal, of course, could be
remedied by the parties themselves through a provision addressing
the effect of such a transaction on the rightholder's privilege. The
provision would answer whether the package deal is to trigger the
right of first refusal, and if so, whether the rightholder would be
allowed to exercise her privilege on the burdened portion alone or
on the entire package. There is, however, every indication that in
many circumstances, the costs of agreeing to a provision addressing
the somewhat remote possibility of a dispute arising out of a pack-
age deal will outweigh its benefits. As a result, parties to right-of-
first-refusal agreements will continue to omit a provision address-
ing the possibility of a package deal. Therefore, a consistent and
uniform judicial treatment of the package deal is desirable. The
most appropriate solution is for the courts to adopt a default rule
that would apply to all instances of the package deal, unless the
parties to a right-of-first-refusal agreement contracted around the
rule explicitly. In terms of fairness and efficiency, the most appro-
priate default rule is to require an owner who receives an accepta-
ble offer for a package deal to provide the rightholder with an
opportunity to purchase the burdened portion of the package at a
reasonable price. If the owner fails to do so, the rightholder should
be entitled to enforce her privilege by purchasing the burdened
property at a price determined by the court to be fair and
reasonable.
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